Neither Realistic nor Constitutionally sound: The Problem of the FCC\u27s Community Standard for Broadcast Indecency Determinations by Kaneb, Michael
Boston College Law Review
Volume 49
Issue 4 Number 4 Article 4
9-1-2008
Neither Realistic nor Constitutionally sound: The
Problem of the FCC's Community Standard for
Broadcast Indecency Determinations
Michael Kaneb
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Communications Law Commons, and the First Amendment Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Michael Kaneb, Neither Realistic nor Constitutionally sound: The Problem of the FCC's Community
Standard for Broadcast Indecency Determinations, 49 B.C.L. Rev. 1081 (2008),
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol49/iss4/4
NEITHER REALISTIC NOR
CONSTITUTIONALLY SOUND: THE
PROBLEM OF THE FCC'S COMMUNITY
STANDARD FOR BROADCAST INDECENCY
DETERMINATIONS
Abstract: The Federal Communications Commission exercises the power
to regulate the broadcast of constitutionally protected indecent speech
under a standard upheld by the•U.S. Supreme Court in its 1978 decision
in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation. In the thirty years since that decision, how-
ever, the FCC has pursued an increasingly idiosyncratic application of the
Pacifica test that disposes with local community standards as the legal
benchmark of indecency. In doing so, the FCC's approach rejects the ju-
dicial sources that originally legitimized the Pacifica indecency test, con-
flicts with the statutory authority by which the FCC regulates broadcasting
generally, and contradicts the Court's specific and more recent rulings on
indecency in the context of other media. In its upcoming review of Fox
Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, the Court will have an opportunity to cor-
rect the anomalies of the FCC's broadcast indecency regime. The Court
should require that the FCC refer to local community standards in mak-
ing its indecency determinations and bring the Commission's exercise of
this authority into line with governing principles of First Amendment law.
INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Supreme Court's recent grant of certiorari to review the
2007 decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
Fox Television. Stations, Inc. v. FCC gives the Court its first chance to con-
sider the constitutionality of government regulation of indecent broad-
cast speech since its 1978 decision in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation.' In Fox,
the Second Circuit vacated an order of the Federal Communications
Commission (the "FCC" or the "Commission") that sanctioned a group
of television broadcasters for violating an FCC policy prohibiting the
broadcast of "fleeting expletives" as indecent speech.2
 Because the Sec-
t See FCC V. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1647, 1647 (2008) (granting certio-
rari). See generally FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Fox Television Stations, Inc.
v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 1647 (2008).
2 See 489 F.3d at 447. Under the FCC's policy, the broadcast of an isolated, offensive
term could result in a sanction. Complaints Against Various Broad. Licensees Regarding
1081
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and Circuit's ruling in Fox overturned the order only on the ground
that the Commission's "fleeting expletive" policy represented an arbi-
trary and capricious change in policy in violation of the Administrative
Procedure Act, the court's holding did not reach the constitutional
challenges to the FCC's indecency regime raised by the appeal. ) Never-
theless, the court in Fox followed its holding with twelve pages of discus-
sion it openly acknowledged as unnecessary to its decision. 4 The opin-
ion went on to review a number of these challenges and to conclude
that the arguments under which the Supreme Court has historically
permitted the FCC to regulate indecent broadcast speech may no
longer be viable. 5 The Supreme Court's decision to accept the Fox ap-
peal suggests that, in its first review of a broadcast indecency case in
thirty years, the Court will address the constitutional challenges the
Second Circuit acknowledged but did not decide. 8
The Supreme Court first confirmed the FCC's constitutional au-
thority to regulate indecent broadcast speech in 1978 in Pacifica. 7 By a
5-to-4 margin, the Pacifica decision reversed the ruling of the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and held that the FCC
was authorized to regulate the broadcast of indecent language in ra-
dio communications and to sanction broadcasters for violations of its
newly formulated regulatory policy under the previously neglected
provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 1464. 8 Though a similar content-based, goy-
Their Airing of the "Golden Globes Awards" Program (Golden Globes), 19 F.C.C.R. 4975,
4980 (2004). The rock star Bono's exclamation upon receiving an award that "this is really,
really fucking brilliant" resulted in the first instance of the FCC's exercise of this new pol-
icy. See id. at 4976 n.4. This reversed a long-standing policy under which passing and iso-
lated uses of such language would not constitute indecency. See Fox, 489 F.3d at 451; Golden
Globes, 19 F.C.C.R. at 4980; Indus. Guidance on the Comm'n's Case Law Interpreting 18
U.S.C. § 1464 and Enforcement Policies Regarding Broad. Indecency (2001 Indus. Guid-
ance), 16 F.C.C.R. 7999,8003 (2001).
3 See Fox, 489 F.3d at 447. On nearly identical reasoning, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit vacated an FCC order assessing penalties to CBS television stations for
the fleeting broadcast of an image of the performer Janet Jackson's exposed breast during
the 2004 Super Bowl Halftime Show. See CBS Corp. v. FCC, No. 06-3575, slip op. at 6 (3rd
Cir. 2008). Consistent with the Second Circuit's ruling on the FCC's "fleeting expletives"
policy in Fox, the Third Circuit held hi CBS that the FCC's newly introduced practice of
including "fleeting images" within the scope of actionable indecency represented an arbi-
trary and capricious change in policy and therefore was invalid under the Administrative
Procedure Act. Id. at 49; see Fox, 489 F.3d at 447.
4 See Fox, 489 F.3d at 462-74.
5 See id.
6 See id.
438 U.S. at 751.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2000) (prohibiting the utterance of any "obscene, indecent, or
profane language by means of radio communication"); Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 751.
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ernmental restriction on speech would have been held presumptively
invalid in any other context, the Court explained that the unique
characteristics of the broadcast medium warranted a relaxed standard
of First Amendment scrutiny and held that the FCC's policy imple-
menting this authority did not impermissibly burden First Amend-
ment rights of free expression. 9 The decision has long been criticized
by First Amendment scholars as an unjustified endorsement of gov-
ernment controls on private speech.i°
Less obvious and less frequently discussed than the uncertain ra-
tionale or problematic doctrine of Pacifica are the complications that
have resulted from the definition of indecency introduced by the FCC
in that case and apparently endorsed by the Supreme Court in the
'Pacifica ruling." The FCC's order in Citizen's Complaint Against Pacifica
Foundation Station WBAI (FM) (Pacifica Order), which was ultimately
affirmed by the Supreme Court in Pacifica, defines indecency as lan-
guage that in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary
community standards for the broadcast medium, [describes] sexual or
9 See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 741 n.17 ("Mt is well settled that the First Amendment has a
special meaning in the broadcast context."); id. at 748, 750-51. But see R.A.V. v. St. Paul,
505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (establishing generally that content-based regulations are "pre-
sumptively invalid"). Precisely what measure of relaxation the Court intends in its scrutiny
of broadcast regulation is not perfectly clear. See Fox, 489 F.3d at 464 (recognizing some
tension in the law regarding the level of First Amendment scrutiny appropriate to broad-
cast speech). Most likely, it means that restrictions on broadcast speech will be subject to
an intermediate level of scrutiny and upheld when the restriction is narrowly tailored to
serve a substantial governmental interest, while a similar restriction in another context
would require a compelling governmental interest. See FCC V. League of Women Voters of
Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 376 (1984). It may also mean that restricting certain kinds of speech or
compelling certain other kinds of speech—burdens that would be judged too substantial
in any other context—will be allowed because of the purportedly unique aspects of broad-
cast speech. See id. at 380; Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-50; Red Lion Broad. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367, 388-89 (1969); Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943); Network
Programming Inquiry, 25 Fed. Reg. 7291, 7292-93 (FCC Aug, 3, 1960).
"See generally Jim Chen, Conduit-Based Regulation of Speech, 54 Duxr. U. 1359 (2005);
Joshua B. Gordon, Pacifica Is Dead. Long Live Pacifica: Formulating a New Argument Structure
to Preserve Government Regulation of Indecent Broadcasts, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1451 (2006); Adam
Thierer, Why Regulate Broadcasting? Toward a Consistent First Amendment Standard for the In-
formation Age, 15 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 431 (2007); Jonathan Weinberg. Iiigueness and
Indecency, 3 Vim.. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 221 (1996); Christoper S. lb°, The Rise and Demise of
the Technology-Specific Approach to the First Amendment, 91 GEO. L.J. 245 (2003).
n See 438 U.S. at 745 (establishing that the question in the case is whether the broad-
cast of material that is indecent according to the FCC's definition may be regulated by the
agency); see also Citizen's Complaint Against Pacifica Found. Station WBAI (FM) (Pacifica
Order), 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 97 (1975), rend sub nom. Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9 (D.C.
Cir. 1977), read, 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (introducing the FCC's standard for evaluating inde-
cency in the context of finding a violation by WBAI-FM).
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excretory activities and organs, at times of the day when there is a rea-
sonable risk that children may be in the audience." 12
The immediate effect of the FCC's definition was to distinguish
indecency for the first time from the narrower category of obscenity,
which the Court had previously established must depict explicitly sex-
ual conduct in a patently offensive way and must be characterized by
an appeal to prurient interest. 13 The Pacifica Order's indecency defini-
tion, however, was crafted from the Court's own, earlier definition of
obscenity; and thus the two categories are related by law, much as they
are connected in popular understanding."
The Court in Pacifica was silent on the FCC's adoption of "con-
temporary community standards for the broadcast medium" as a legal
benchmark for offensiveness. 15 As a result, lower courts have hesitated
to consider challenges to the FCC's reliance on it. 16 In the context of
obscenity law, which is the original, judicial source of the community
standard, the Court has a long history of insisting that determinations
of offensiveness be made by reference to a local community, however
broadly conceived. 17 More recently, the Court has extended that
view—and its presumption that such a formulation contributes mean-
ingfully to First Amendment protections—to its evaluation of statutes
regulating indecent content in nonbroadcast media, such as tele-
12 Pacifica Order, 56 F.C.C.2d at 97. The text of the FCC's definition has remained un-
changed since originally issued; however, the Commission has given periodic elaborations
and illustrations of its application of the rule to specific circumstances, particularly since
its decision in 1987 to extend enforcement beyond the specific facts of Pacifica. See generally
Golden Globes, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975; 2001 Indus. Guidance, 16 F.C.C.R. 7999; Infinity Broad.
Corp. of Pa. (Infinity), 3 F.C.C.R. 930 (1987).
13 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). One of the holdings of Pacifica is that,
at least in the context of broadcasting, indecent speech may be distinguished from ob-
scene speech, See 438 U.S. at 741. Both categories are determined to be offensive by con-
temporary community standards, but for speech to be found to be obscene, it must appeal
to prurient interest and also lack serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. Com-
pare id., with Miller, 431 U.S. at 24.
14 See infra, notes 110-123 and accompanying text.
15 See generally 438 U.S. 726.
16 See Fox, 489 F.3d at 465; Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332, 1338
(D.C. Cir. 1988). Among the constitutional challenges noted by the court of appeals but
not decided in Fox was the appellants' argument that -the FCC's 'community standards'
analysis is arbitrary and meaningless," See Fox, 489 F.3d at 454. Even while acknowledging
itself as bound by the precedent of Pacifica, the Fox court expressed great skepticism that
the FCC's indecency test would now survive a First Amendment challenge. See Fox, 489 F.3d
at 464-66.
17 See Miller; 413 U.S. at 30, 37; see also Sable Comment of Cal. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115,
124-25 (1989); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 157 (1974); Handing v. United States, 418
U.S. 87, 106 (1974).
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phone messaging services (i.e., "dial-a-porn"), cable television, and
the internet. 18
 The FCC, by contrast, has long insisted that in regulat-
ing broadcast content, the community on which it relies in determin-
ing a standard of offensiveness is "not a local one" and therefore
"does not encompass any particular geographic area." 19
 The FCC as-
serts that the community contemplated by its standard instead reflects
"a broader standard for broadcasting generally," a circumlocution that
seems to establish a national standard without naming it as such. 20
Over time, the FCC's idiosyncratic use of the contemporary com-
munity standards benchmark has given rise to both constitutional and
regulatory conflicts. 21
 First, the FCC's ever-evolving interpretation and
application of the community standard has resulted in sharp inconsis-
tencies between the FCC's use of the standard and the constitutional
purpose for which the Court originally adopted the standard in the
context of obscenity: 22
 Second, the FCC has applied the community
standard to indecency determinations in a manner that directly con-
flicts with the statutory authority under which it regulates broadcasting
generally, resulting in a fundamental conflict with its own internal regu-
latory policies and practices. 23
The recent history of Supreme Court decisions resolving chal-
lenges to statutes that import Pacifica's definition of indecency and its
reliance on contemporary community standards in order to regulate
indecency in other media evidence the Court's continuing disposition
to depend upon local communities as the best guarantee of the consti-
tutional protection due to controversial speech. 24 Accordingly, its rul-
ings in these cases also display the Court's great reluctance to endorse
19 See Ashcroft v. ACLU (Ashcroft I), 535 U.S. 564, 583 (2002); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S.
844, 874 n.39, 877-78 (1997); Denver Area Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727,
753, 763 (1996); Sable, 492 U.S. at 124-25.
19
 2001 Indus. Guidance, 16 F.C.C.R. at 8002.
20 Infinity, 3 F.C.C.R. ai 933. Commissioner Jonathan Adelstein, for one, has recently
admitted that the Commission's repeated assertion that the applicable standard is not a
local one" but based '`on a broader standard for broadcasting generally" means that the
Commission applies a national indecency standard." See Complaints Against Various Televi-
sion Licensees Concerning Their February 1, 2004 Broadcast of the Super Bowl XXXVIII
Halftime Show (Super Bowl), 21 F.C.C.R. 2760, 2785 (2006) (statement of Commissioner
Adelstein).
21 See infra notes 229-271 and accompanying text.
22
 See infra notes 253-265 and accompanying text.
29 See Paul ]. Feldman, The FCC and Regulation of Broadcast Indecency: Is There a National
Broadcast Standard in the Audience?, 41 FED. Comm. LJ., 369, 396-98 (1989); see also infra
notes 249-252 and accompanying text.
24
 See Ashcroft I, 535 U.S. at 583; Reno, 521 U.S. at 874 n.39, 877-78; Denver Area, 518
U.S. at 753, 763; Sable, 492 U.S. at 124-25.
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any standard that purports to derive its authority from the views of a "na-
tional" community. 25 These recent decisions shed considerable light on
how the Court would rule today on a challenge to the FCC's conception
of community standards in the context of broadcast indecency. 26 With
its decision to grant review of the Second Circuit's Fox decision, the
Court now has an opportunity to address the question directly. 27
This Note argues that in a broad-based review of the FCC's broad-
cast indecency policy, the Supreme Court should insist that the FCC
rely upon the standards of the local community in which the allegedly
indecent material was broadcast in making its determination whether a
particular broadcast may be considered patently offensive and thus a
violation of § 1464. 28 Such a rule would (1) establish general confor-
mity between obscenity and indecency evaluations in all adjudicatory
contexts; (2) establish consistency between the FCC's indecency prac-
tices in the broadcast context and the Court's requirements of inde-
cency standards for other media; (3) bring the FCC's indecency policy
into harmony with the terms of the statutory authority and the policies
and practices under which the FCC regulates broadcasting generally;
and (4) bring this element of broadcast regulation more closely into
line with the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence. 29
Part 1 of this Note reviews the origin of the FCC's statutory au-
thority to regulate radio and television broadcasting generally and
broadcast content specifically and notes the primary value that local-
ism holds in establishing the Commission's regulatory practices and
policies under this authority." Part II examines the history of the Su-
preme Court's adoption of contemporary community standards as a
constitutionally required element in obscenity determinations and
explains the Court's rationale for relying on varying local communi-.
ties rather than a single national community as the source of such
standards." Part III traces the FCC's adoption of the basic terms and
framework of the Court's obscenity definition in formulating its own
22 See Ashcroft I, 535 U.S. at 583; Reno, 521 U.S. at 874 n.39, 877-78; see also Sable, 492
U.S. at 125-26. But see Ashcroft 1, 535 U.S. at 587 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (advocating
for the introduction of a national standard for application to the Internet); id. at 590
(Breyer, J., concurring) (arguing that the Congress intended the application of a national
standard under the statute at issue).
26 See infra notes 170-228 and accompanying text.
27 See Fox, 128 S. Ci. at 1647 (granting certiorari).
28 See infra notes 269-271 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 230-271 and accotnpanying text.
38 See infra notes 35-64 and accompanying text.
2 ' See infra notes 65-109 and accompanying text.
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definition of indecency in the FCC's 1975 Pacifica. Order and highlights
the distinctions the FCC has attempted to draw over time between its
practices and the Court's application of its obscenity standard. 32 Part
IV reviews the Court's continuing commitment to the use of local
community standards by examining its recent rulings on indecency
regulation in other, nonbroadcast electronic media and by consider-
ing the jurisprudential commitments these rulings reveal." Part V
considers the practical and constitutional consequences of the failure
of the FCC's indecency policy to meet the Court's requirements and
recommends that the Court remedy these conflicts by requiring the
FCC to adopt a practice of determining indecency through meaning-
ful consultation of local standards.34
I. LOCALISM AS A VALUE IN FCC REGULATORY PRACTICES
In the 1920s and 1930s, the rapid, unregulated growth of radio
broadcasting produced a disorder of competing uses, resulting in a
level of technical interference that threatened the successful develop-
ment of broadcasting as a viable means of mass communication." In
order to remedy this perceived crisis, the Communications Act of 1934
authorized the Federal Communications Commission (the "FCC" or
the "Commission") to license and regulate radio and television broad-
cast stations to serve the "public convenience, interest, or necessity." 36
Under this grant, the Supreme Court has ruled Congress "gave the
Commission not niggardly but expansive powers,"" including the au-
thority not only to address technical and engineering matters, such as
determining broadcast signal coverage areas, but also to regulate pro-
gram content in order to promote the "larger and more effective use of
radio in the public interest."38 FCC regulation of broadcasting under
this grant applies almost entirely at the level of the individual radio or
television station, each of which is licensed under FCC regulations to a
52 See infra notes 110-169 and accompanying text.
33 See infra notes 170-228 and accompanying text.
34 See infra notes 230-271 and accompanying text.
36 See Red Lion Broad. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,388 (1969); Nat'l Broad. Co. v. FCC, 319
U.S. 190,210-15 (1943) (rehearsing a complete history of early federal schemes to regu-
late broadcasting and the eventual resolution provided in the Communications Act of
1934).
" See 47 U.S.C.A. § 307(a) (West 2001 & Supp. 2008).
37 See Nat'l Broad., 319 U.S. at 219.
314 See 47 U.S.C. § 303(g) (2000); League of Women Voiers of Cal. v. FCC, 468 U.S. 364,
377(1984); Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 388-89; Nat'l Broad., 319 U.S. at 217,226.
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particular, local community the Commission designates as its "commu-
nity of license."39
The FCC's regulation of program content operates in two man-
ners: first, prescriptively, by requiring the broadcast of programming
that is asserted or determined to be of value to the broadcaster's
community of license and therefore consistent with the public inter-
est;40 and second, proscriptively, by prohibiting the broadcast of pro-
gramming that is asserted or determined to be harmful to the public
interest.`' Both methods of regulation rely on local determination of
the needs, interests, and tastes of the population that is served by the
licensee's broadcast signal, and both depend on monitoring and en-
forcement mechanisms that operate locally as well.42
In justifying its prescriptive programming requirements, the FCC
has consistently explained that the grant of a broadcast license obli-
gates the licensed station to program principally for the benefit of its
designated community of license. 43 The essential requirement of the
public interest standard, therefore, consists of "a diligent, positive and
continuing effort by the licensee to discover and fulfill the tastes,
Sec 47 U.S.C. § 303(d), (h) (granting the FCC the power and duty to determine the
location of classes of stations or individual stations and to establish areas or zones to be
served by any station); id. § 307(a), (b) (authorizing the FCC to grant broadcast licenses in
service to public convenience, interest, or necessity and requiring that distributions of
licenses be made "among the several States and communities" in a manner that will pro-
duce a fair, efficient, and equitable distribution); 47 C.F.R. § 73.1120 (2008).
By way of example, under the FCC's licensing scheme, the maximum signal permitted
to an analog FM radio station produces a circular coverage pattern with a diameter of 114
miles; the maximum signal permitted to an analog VHF television station produces a circu-
lar coverage pattern with a diameter of 160 miles. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.211 (2008) (specifying
classifications for FM radio stations); id. § 73.614 (specifying classifications for television
stations).
43 See League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 377; Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 389; see also Deregu-
lation of Radio (Radio Deregulation Order), 84 F.C.C.2d 968, 978-79, 987-92 (1981); Net-
work Programming Inquiry, 25 Fed. Reg. 7291, 7294-96 (FCC Aug. 3, 1960). See generally
Primer on Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants (Ascertainment
Primer), 27 F.C.C.2d 650 (1971).
" See 18 U.S.C. § 1304 (2000) (prohibiting the broadcast of lotteries or numbers
games); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1343 (West 2001 & Stipp. 2008) (fraud by radio); 18 U.S.C. § 1464
(2000) (obscene, indecent, or profane utterance); 47 U.S.C. § 303(m) (1)(D) (1) (granting
the FCC power to suspend a broadcaster's license for the transmission of false or deceptive
signals or communications); see also Network Programming Inquiry, 25 Fed. Reg. at 7293.
42 See infra notes 53-64 and accompanying text.
43 See Broadcast Localism, 23 F.C.C.R. 1324, 1327 (2008); Revision of Programming
and Commercialization Policies, Ascertainment Requirements, and Program Log Re-
quirements for Commercial Television Stations (Television Deregulation Order), 98 F.C.C.2d
1075, 1084 (1984); Radio Deregulation Order, 84 F.C.C. 2d at 989; Network Programming
Inquiry, 25 Fed. Reg. at 7294, 7295.
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needs, and desires of his community or service area."44 To fulfill its
statutory obligation to grant local broadcast licenses in accordance
with the public interest, the FCC conditions license grants, modifica-
tions, transfers, and renewals on a satisfactory demonstration by licen-
sees of their efforts to determine these local needs and to satisfy them
by the delivery of responsive programming." The FCC gave its niost
complete expression to what the public interest requires of licensees
in this regard in its 1960 Programming Statement, which also adopted
formal ascertainment procedures requiring licensees to compile de-
mographic data and conduct polling in their communities of license
and the surrounding geography to authenticate their efforts to iden-
tify pressing community needs."
In the 1980s, as part of a general movement toward federal deregu-
lation, the FCC eliminated the requirement that licensees submit formal
documentation of the investigations called for by the Programming State-
ment, but it maintained the requirement that licensees regularly report
to the Commission both their determination of community needs and
the programming broadcast in response to these needs. 47
 In January
2008, the FCC concluded a four-year Localism in Broadcasting review
intended to enhance localism by finding ways to improve programming
targeted to local needs and interests." Among the actions following
from its review are a return to some of the reporting requirements
eliminated under deregulation and a proposal that licensees be obli-
gated to conduct quarterly meetings with a board of community advisors
44
 Network Programming Inquiry, 25 Fed. Reg. at 7294,7295-96.
46 See 47 U.S.C. § 307(a), (d); Radio Deregulation Order, 84 F.C.C.2d at 990-92.
46 See Network Programming Inquiry, 25 Fed. Reg. at 7296. This formal ascertainment
procedure developed from the broad charge of the FCC's 1960 Network Programming
Inquiry, which instructed licensees to make a "cam-ass of the listening public who will re-
ceive the signal and who constitute a definite public interest figure" and to consult with
representative community leaders who could "bespeak the interests which make up the
community." See 25 Fed. Reg. at 7296. The FCC eventually codified the steps necessary to
fulfill these obligations in its Ascertainment Primer, a "how-to" manual for satisfying the as-
certainment and reporting requirements promulgated in the Network Programming In-
quiry. Sec generally Ascertainment Primer, 27 F.C.C.2d 650.
47
 See Television Deregulation Order, 98 F.C.C.2d at 1089-90; Radio Deregulation Order, 84
F.C.C.2d at 991-92. The FCC explained that the philosophy of the Radio Deregulation Order
was consistent with that expressed in the 1960 Network Programming Inquiry: the "bed-
rock obligation" of "public interest" consisted in delivering programming to "serve the
specific interests" of the broadcaster's community of license. Radio Deregulation Order, 84
F.C.C.2d at 978.
48
 See generally Broadcast Localism, 23 F.C.C.R. 1324.
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to determine the needs and interests of their communities of license. 49
The long history of this detailed regulatory framework governing local
program needs confirms that under both statutory grant and estab-
lished policy, localism has always been conceived of as an essential ele-
ment of the FCC's regulation of content in the public interest. 50
FCC regulations proscribe a range of content types deemed to he
harmful to the public interest. 51 The most substantial category is the
area of obscene, indecent, or profane utterances prohibited under 18
U.S.C. § 1464. 52 The FCC exercises its authority to proscribe harmful
program content in a manner that reflects the fundamentally local na-
ture of its regulatory authority and policies as well, notwithstanding its
rejection of a local standard for the purposes of its indecency definition
under § 1464. 53 The FCC, for instance, does not independently moni-
tor broadcasts for indecent material. 54 Instead, it considers only docu-
mented complaints of indecent broadcasting received from the pub-
lic. 55 Under the FCC's general practice, even though an individual
complaint regarding local broadcast of network-produced material
might be considered evidence that indecent material has been broad-
45 See id. at 1329, 1336; see also Standardized and Enhanced Disclosure Requirements
for Television Broad. Licensee Public Interest Obligations, 23 F.C.C.R. 1274, 1274, 1290
(2008).
5° See Broadcast Localism, 23 F.C.C.R, at 1327 (noting that the FCC's broadcast regula-
tory framework is designed to foster a system of local stations that respond to the unique
concerns and interests of the audiences within their stations' respective service areas);
Radio Deregulation Order, 84 F.C.C.2d at 986-87.
51 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2000) (authorizing penalties for the broadcast of obscene,
indecent, or profane language); 47 C.F.R. § 73.3999 (establishing FCC rules necessary for
the enforcement of 18 U.S.C. § 1464); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1304 (prohibiting the broadcast
of lotteries or numbers games); 18 U.S.C.A § 1343 (prohibiting fraud by radio).
52 18 U.S.C. § 1464 ("Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane language by
means of radio communication shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
two years, or both."). Penalties for violation of § 1464 may reach $325,000 for a single inci-
dent or $3,000,000 for a continuing, single event. 47 U.S.C.A. § 503 (b) (2) (C) (ii) (West
2001 & Supp. 2008). The FCC may suspend a broadcast license for violation of § 1464. 47
U.S.C. 303 (m) (1) (o) (2000). The FCC may also revoke a broadcast license for violation of
§ 1464. 47 U.S.C. § 312(a) (6); see also Complaints Against Various Broad, Licensees Re-
garding Their Airing of the "Golden Globes Awards" Program (Golden Globes), 19 F.C.C.R.
4975, 4982 (2004) (warning that serious multiple violations of the FCC's indecency rule
may lead to the commencement of revocation proceedings). Finally, violation of § 1464 is
grounds for denying a renewal of a broadcast license because such a denial may be in the
public interest. 47 U.S.C.A. § 307(c) (1) (West 2001 & Supp. 2008).
53 See infra notes 149-169 and accompanying text.
54 Indus. Guidance on the Comm'n's Case Law Interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1464 and En-
forcement Policies Regarding Broad. Indecency (2001 Indus. Guidance), 16 F.C.C.R. 7999,
8015 (2001).
55 See id.
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cast by all licensees across the country who have transmitted the net-
work programming, the FCC will investigate only those licensees whose
broadcasts to their communities have generated written complaints to
the FCC.56
Likewise, the FCC assesses sanctions for violations of its proscrip-
tive programming requirements only at the level of the broadcast licen-
see operating within an individual community of license. 57
 This aspect
of the FCC's locally determined regulatory framework is manifest in the
FCC rulings contested in the 2007 case decided by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC.59 In
the rulings at issue in Fox, the FCC had issued orders finding that televi-
sion licensees who had broadcast "fleeting expletives" in network Pro-
gramming within their licensed communities, rather than the national,
corporate network producing the programming, had violated the pro-
hibition against the utterance of indecent language contained in 18
U.S.C. § 1464. 59
 Thus, the parent corporation operating the Fox Televi-
sion Network itself faced no FCC sanction or liability, but Fox subsidiar-
ies holding individual broadcast licenses as owned and operated affili-
ates of the network did, as did independently-owned affiliates of the
Fox Network who broadcast the programming provided by the network
but took no role in its production.60
Given the FCC's regulatory focus on the individual broadcast li-
censee operating within a distinct, local community, it is peculiar that
the Commission's recent, high-profile indecency rulings appear to rely
56
 See id. See generally Infinity Broad. Corp. of Pa. (WISP), 2 F.C.C.R. 2705 (1987).
Commissioner Jonathan Adelstein has expressed his disagreement with the FCC's general
practice of finding violations of § 1464 by network affiliates only in dime communities in
which the broadcatt has been the subject of a viewer complaint. See Complaints Against
Various Television Licensees Concerning Their Feb. 1, 2004 Broad. of the Super Bowl
XXXVIII Halftime Show (Super Bowl), 21 F.C.C.R. 2760, 2784-85 (2006) (statement of
Commissioner Adelstein).
57 See Golden Globes, 19 F.C.C.R. at 4982 (finding violations by individual broadcast li-
censees for the airing of network-produced programming).
68
 See 489 F.3d 444, 451-52 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 128 S, Ct. 1647 (2008); Golden
Globes, 19 F.C.C.R. at 4982.
59 See 18 U.S.C. § 1464; 47 U.S.C.A. § 503(b) (2) (establishing forfeitures for violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1464 by broadcast licensees); Fox, 489 F.3d at 451-52; Golden Globes, 19
F.C.C.R. at 4975-76, 4984-87; see also Complaints Regarding Various Television Broads.
Between Feb. 2, 2002 and Mar. 8, 2005 (Omnibus Order), 21 F.C.C.R. 2664, 2665, 2720-21
(2006) (applying liability under the FCC's "fleeting expletive" policy to individual broad-
cast licensees for incidents similar to that addressed in the Golden Globes proceeding).
6° See Omnibus Order, 21 F.C.C.R. at 2665, 2720-21; Golden Globes, 19 F.C.C.R. at 4975-
76, 4984-87.
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so strongly on the national nature of the telecasts at issue. 61 The FCC's
2004 order in Golden Globes, for instance, insists that it was particularly
"shocking and gratuitous" that the word "fucking" was broadcast on a
"nationally telecast awards ceremony." 62 Likewise, the FCC's 2006 order
in Super Bowl found the sexually charged halftime show performance at
issue in that proceeding particularly culpable because it had been
broadcast "to a nationwide audience." 63 These recent orders appear to
suggest that if either of these broadcasts had been transmitted to a sin-
gle community; the material at issue would somehow have resulted in a
less egregious violation, or perhaps none at all, but such a conclusion is
clearly at odds with the logic of the FCC's enforcement practices and
the statutory authority under which the FCC applies them. 64
II. ORIGINS OF THE CONTEMPORARY COMMUNITY STANDARD
The U.S. Supreme Court first endorsed the use of "contemporary
community standards" as a benchmark for obscenity determinations
in Roth v. United States in 1957.66 Roth's primary holding was that ob-
scenity does not fall within the area of constitutionally protected
speech or press. 66 Its other significant contribution was, necessarily, to
advance a legal definition of obscenity that lower courts could rely on
in applying statutes prohibiting obscenity. 67 The appellant in Roth had
been convicted of distributing obscene materials in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1461, which provides criminal penalties for the mailing of
material that is "obscene, lewd, lascivious ... [or] filthy."68 The jury in
Roth had been instructed to determine the obscenity of the ques-
tioned material by considering its effect "upon all those whom it is
likely to reach. In other words, you determine its impact upon the av-
erage person in the community.... You may ask yourselves does it
offend the common conscience of the community by present-clay stan-
dards. "69
61
 See Super Bowl, 21 F.C.C.R. at 2771; Golden Globes, 19 F.C.C.R. at 4979.
62 See Golden Globes, 19 F.C.C.R. at 4979 (emphasis added); see also id. at 4989 (state-
ment of Commissioner Abernathy) ("[U]se of the 'f-word' on a nationally telecast awards
ceremony is shocking, gratuitous, and offensive.").
a3 See Super Bowl, 21 F.C.C.R. at 2771.
64 See id.; Golden Globes, 19 F.C.C.R. at 4979; see also 47 U.S.C. § 1464.
BS 354 U.S. 476,489-90 (1957).
66 Id. at 485
67 Id. at 489-90.
68 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (2000); Roth, 354 U.S. at 480.
69 354 U.S. at 490.
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In approving the trial court's instruction, the Roth court explicitly
rejected a competing approach that had judged the offensiveness of
sexually oriented material by its effect upon particularly susceptible
persons." In Roth, the Court held that such a test was unconstitutionally
restrictive of freedoms of speech and of the press because it potentially
excluded from circulation material "legitimately treating with sex" as a
worthy matter of human interest and public concern simply because
the material in question might be harmful or offensive to an unrepre-
sentative minority unusually affected by frank treatment of sexually ori-
ented con ten t. 71
 Roth's reliance on a broadly conceived contemporary
community standard thus aimed to protect potentially controversial
speech for the benefit of the wider community against the prohibitions
of an especially sensitive or intolerant minority—against what would
later come to be referred to as the "heckler's veto." 72
The Supreme Court struggled over the next sixteen years to re-
solve the unspecified details of Roth's application." During this period,
the Court debated what sort of community Roth and the Constitution
required as the source of contemporary community standards. 74
 This
was the central point of dispute, for example, in the Court's conflicting
7° See id. at 489. As noted by the Court, the "susceptible persons" approach followed
the nineteenth century British precedent of R v. Hicklin, (1868) 3 Q.B. 360, 371. See Roth,
354 U.S. at 489.
71 See 354 U.S. at 487, 489.
72
 See Ashcroft v. ACLU (Ashcroft 1), 535 U.S. 564, 590 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 880 (1997); Roth, 354
U.S. at 487, 489. For a useful history of jurisprudential origins of the concept of contem-
porary community standards, see Mark Cenite, Federalizing or Eliminating Online Obscenity
Law as an Alternative to Contemporary Community Standards, 9 Comm. L. R PoL'Y 25, 30-32
(2004). Cenite points out that the benchmark of a contemporary community standard was
first introduced to U.S. obscenity law by Judge Learned Hand in 1913. Sec id. at 30-31.
73 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 22 (1973), Because no majority of the Court was
able to agree in this interim period on a standard more specific than the two basic hold-
ings advanced by Roth, the Court was obliged to engage in repetitive, case-by-case reviews
of obscenity prosecutions, reversing convictions only when at least five members of the
Court, applying their separate tests, found the material in question to be unprotected by
the First Amendment. See id. at 22 11.3. The Court decided thirty-one cases in this ad hoc
manner. See id; see also Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 770-71 (1967) (inventorying the
variety of views among the members of the Court at that moment). See generally Memoirs v.
Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1965); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1963); Manual En-
ters. s Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1961); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959); Kingsley Int'l
Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of the State of New York, 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
74
 See Manual Enters., 370 U.S. at 488 (Harlan, J., announcing the judgment of the
Court). Compare facobellis, 378 U.S. at 192, 194-95 (Brennan, J., announcing the judgment
of the Court), with id. at 200 (Warren, CI, dissenting).
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opinions in the 1964 case of Jacobellis a Ohio. 75 In Jacobellis, the Court
reversed the conviction of a movie theater manager who had been
prosecuted under a state obscenity statute for the possession and exhi-
bition of a sexually explicit foreign film. 76 Although six members of the
Court concurred in the judgment to reverse the conviction, the case
produced four separate opinions, and none received the endorsement
of more than two justices."
The main point of disagreement in Jacobellis was whether Roth
permitted deference to prevailing community standards in the judicial
district in which the case had been tried or whether it required reliance
on some notion of a uniform, national community standard. 78 The re-
peated argument of Justice Brennan in his opinion announcing the
judgment of the Court was that contemporary community standards
must reference a consistent, national standard: "It is, after all, a na-
tional Constitution we are expounding:19 A work judged not to be ob-
scene against the liberal national standard Justice Brennan envisioned
would be protected against contrary determinations in any smaller, less
tolerant community.8° As a result, the protections of the First Amend-
75 Compare facobellis, 378 U.S. at 192,194-95 (Brennan, j., announcing the judgment of
the Court), with id. at 200 (Warren, CJ., dissenting).
76 Sec id. at 185-87 (Brennan, J., announcing the judgment of the Court).
77 See id. at 185-96; id. at 196-97 (Black, j., concurring); id. at 197 (Stewart, J., concur-
ring); id. at 197-98 (Goldberg, J., concurring). The film in question had been shown to
favorable reviews and some critical acclaim in major cities across the United States, and the
evidence of its obscenity was limited to one explicit love scene in its fund reel. See id. at 196.
According to one report, "the love scene deemed objectionable is so fragmentary and
fleeting that only a censor's alert would make an audience conscious that something 'ques-
tionable' is being portrayed." Id. at 197-98.
78 Compare id. at 192,194-95 (Brennan, J., announcing the judgment of the Court),
with id. at 200 (Warren, CI, dissenting).
79 See id. at 195 (Brennan, J., announcing the judgment of the Court).
so See focobeilis, 378 U.S. at 193-94 (Brennan, J., announcing the judgment of the
Court). justice Brennan argued that a consistent, national standard would guarantee some
certainty to a content producer offering to distribute potentially controversial material in a
new market that he would not subject himself to the risk of prosecution or reduced consti-
tutional protection through his failure to discern the peculiar standards of a local com-
munity with which he might not be familiar. See id. More broadly, a consistent, national
standard would also protect the interests of citizens wishing to access such material who
might constitute minorities within more restrictive communities, as well as the collective
interests of more permissive communities who might otherwise be deprived of material
deemed obscene elsewhere by the caution of producers or distributors reluctant to risk
prosecution by 'testing the variation" among communities. See id. Justice Brennan's rejec-
tion of a local standard is thus analogous to the Roth Court's rejection of the "particularly
susceptible persons" consideration of Hicklin: such standards fail to offer the degree of
protection required by the Constitution because they are both too unpredictable and too
restrictive. See id. at 193-95; Roth, 354 U.S. at 475-76.
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ment would not vary according to local differences, and it would be
beyond the power of a state to prohibit the consumption by its citizens
of materials to which the Constitution provides a right of access. 8i
As the disposition of Jacobellis itself demonstrated, however, reli-
ance on the application of a national standard for the evaluation of ob-
scene material ultimately requires reference, at least in the event of a
judicial appeal, to a centralized panel authorized to act as national
tastemakers.82
 Hoping to avoid just that result, Chief Justice Warren
took a position diametrically opposed to Justice Brennan's in his dissent
in Jacobellis. 83 The purpose of the Court in hearing a case such as jacobel-
Warren argued, should be to establish a set of principles in the law
that may be applied by lower courts and legislatures and not merely to
rule on the alleged obscenity of an individual film or book.8
 The Court
was therefore required to produce a rule that was susceptible to local
application .85
The debate over the application of community standards to ob-
scenity prosecutions was filially settled nine years later by the Court's
1973 opinion in Miller v. California, which established a controlling
legal definition of obscenity that a majority of the Court concluded
would satisfy constitutional requirements and also permit practical
application by lower courts.86 The appellant in Miller had been con-
81 See Jacobellis, 378 U.S. at 194 (Brennan, J., announcing the judgment of the Court).
82 See id. at 190. Brennan's opinion in Jacobellis in fact insisted on this by asserting that
in its review of obscenity challenges the Court could not rely on determinations made by
judges or juries because they were likely to have made reference only to the standards of
the particular, local community in which the case arose or was tried; instead, the Court was
obliged to make its own, independent judgment of whether the material involved was con-
stitutionally protected. See id.
83 See id. at 200, 202 (Warren, Cj., dissenting).
94 See id. at 202-03. Aside from the administrative burden such an arrangement would
impose on the Court, questions naturally arose as to the appropriateness or competency of
the nine Justices to ''set standards and to supervise the private morals of the Nation." See
Kingsley, 360 U.S. at 690 (Black, J., concurring). Justice Black, for one, believed the Court
to be "about the most inappropriate Supreme Board of Censors that could be found." Id.
88 See jacobellis, 378 U.S. at 200, 202 (Warren, CJ., dissenting). Chief Justice Warren's
dissent in jacobellis argued further that the Court's own failure to settle upon a standard for
obscenity likely meant that there was "no provable 'national standard,'" with the conse-
quence that reference to a national standard would provide no more clarity or consistent
protection, and likely less, than reliance on determinations made by individual communi-
ties varying in their tastes and preferences. See id. at 200. Chief Justice Warren argued,
therefore, that enforcement of Roth's rule should be committed to state and federal courts
operating by reference to local community standards and with local determinations of
obscenity subject to review by the Court only on a finding of insufficient evidence. See id. at
202.
86 See413 U.S. at 24, 33-34.
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victed of mailing sexually explicit material in violation of a California
statute that largely incorporated the obscenity definition provided by
Roth.87 At trial, the jury had been instructed to rely upon "contempo-
rary community standards of the State of California" in determining
whether the material at issue constituted obscenity, and the appellant
objected on appeal that the constitutional standard required by Roth
and subsequent cases was a national one. 88
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the California
courts in Miller and held that reliance by the jury on the "contemporary
community standards of the State of California" in making its determi-
nation served the protective purpose of Roth and was also constitution-
ally satisfactory. 89 In his majority opinion, Chief Justice Burger ad-
vanced two rationales to support the use of varying local standards
rather than a single, national standard in obscenity determinations."
First, local standards were practically determinable: they were largely
questions of fact and therefore accessible and familiar to citizens and
jurors of actual, local communities." A national standard, by contrast,
was "hypothetical and unascertainable." 92 The nation was simply too big
and diverse to permit such a single formulation, and it was unclear that
any consensus on such questions existed." As a result, requiring a state
court to structure its obscenity proceedings around a national standard
of obscenity would be "an exercise in futility." 94
The second advantage a rule of local standards offered over a na-
tional standard was the protection it provided to individual choice."
The Miller opinion thus made a constitutional merit of the variation
justice Brennan had warned against in facobellis, announcing that diver-
sity of tastes and attitudes among communities across the country was,
in fact, a virtue protected by the First Amendment. 96 Differences of this
sort, the Court concluded, should not be strangled by "the absolutism
87 See id. at 16-18, 23; see also Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 418 (specifying the elements of the
Court's legal standard for obscenity at that moment, which the California statute had in-
corporated, but without making explicit its reliance on a national standard).
es Miller, 413 U.S. at 31.
89 Id. at 33-34.
9° See id. at 30, 33.
91 See id. at 30.
92 Id. at 31. In Miller, Chief Justice Burger noted that his conclusion expanded on the
arguments Chief justice Warren had made in his dissent in jacobellis. See supra note 84 and
accompanying text.
93 See Miller, 413 U.S. at 30.
94 See id.
95 Sec id. at 3211.13, 33.
96 See id. at 33.
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of imposed uniformity" that would potentially apply under a national
community standard administered by the federal judiciary. 97
 In terms
emphasizing cultural differences broadly attributable to varying re-
gional identities, the opinion declared that it was "neither realistic nor
constitutionally sound to read the First Amendment as requiring that
the people of Maine or Mississippi accept public depiction of conduct
found tolerable in Las Vegas, or New York City. 98
In a further recognition of the value of choice, the Miller Court
insisted that in failing to allow for variation in tastes among communi-
ties, a uniform national standard would pose a danger to free expres-
sion at least as great as would reliance on varying local standards be-
cause under a national standard it was inevitable that materials found
tolerable in some places but not under the national standard would
be unavailable to communities that found them acceptable," This is
the flip-side of the risk Justice Brennan had presumed to address by
advocating a national standard in Jacobellis.fi" Since Millet; the Court
has maintained the view that protection of the discretion of the audi-
ence—freedom of choice—is the primary constitutional value secured
by contemporary community standards. 101
 Its decisions conclude that
the possibility of denying a receptive, individual community access to
content potentially subject to prohibition under a national standard
poses a greater risk to free expression than penalizing a speaker who
offends an unexpectedly strict local standard. 1 °"
97 See id. As early as Roth in 1957, Justice Harlan expressed similar concern over the
"deadening uniformity" that he feared would result from nationwide "federal censorship"
under statutes similar to § 1464. See 354 U.S. at 506-07 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
ga See Miller, 413 U.S. at 32.
1/9 See id. at 32 n.13. Choice had emerged as a critical First Amendment value in Su-
preme Court decisions well before Miller's introduction of an acceptable definition of ob-
scenity. See Manual Enters., 370 U.S. at 488 (Harlan, J., announcing the judgment of the
Court); Roth, 354 U.S. at 506 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). As
early as its 1962 decision in Manual Enterprises, the Court had recognized that any rule was
Intolerable" if its effect was to deny to some communities access to content those com-
munities had by their own standards deemed acceptable. See 370 U.S. at 488 (Harlan, J.,
announcing the judgment of the Court); see also Roth, 354 U.S. at 506 (Harlan, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
100 See 378 U.S. at 193 (Brennan, J., announcing the judgment of the Court).
1 ° 1 See Ashcroft I, 535 U.S. at 580-81; Reno, 521 U.S. at 877-78; Denver Area Telecomms.
Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 753, 763 (1996); Sable Commc'ns of Cal. v. FCC, 492
U.S. 115, 124-26 (1989); see also Ashcroft I, 535 U.S. at 612 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1°2 See Ashcroft I, 535 U.S. at 580-81; Reno, 521 U.S. at 877-78; Denver Area, 518 U.S. at
753, 763; Sable, 492 U.S. at 124-26; see also Ashcroft I, 535 U.S. at 612 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing).
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In addition to resolving the community standards question, the
Miller Court announced a three-part test to define obscenity for appli-
cation in state prosecutions that remains the Court's test today:
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a)
whether "the average person, applying contemporary com-
munity standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole,
appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts
or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct spe-
cifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether
the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, po-
litical, or scientific value.'"
The Court has subsequently held that both the "prurient interest"
element of part (a) and the "patently offensive" element of part (b)
are to be judged by reference to contemporary community stan-
dards)" The question of whether the work as a whole lacks serious
value, however, is held to be an objective one, to be considered from
the perspective of a reasonable person and so not dependent upon
the degree of local acceptance a work may have achieved. 105
Cases surfacing in the immediate jurisprudential wake of Miller
clarified remaining nuances of the contemporary community standards
benchmark. 1 °6 For example, in 1974 in Hamling v. United States, the Su-
preme Court concluded that, although a national standard is, accord-
ing to Miller; "hypothetical and unascertainable," it is still not a consti-
tutional requirement that some smaller geographic area be explicitly
substituted in issuing jury instructions) 07 All that is required is that a
juror be permitted to draw upon knowledge of the "community or vici-
nage" from which he or she comes in making the essential determina-
tion) 08 Furthermore, according to the Supreme Court in Jenkins v.
Georgia, decided the same year, the Constitution does not require that
juries be instructed to make reference to a hypothetical, statewide
'°' 413 U.S. at 24 (citation omitted). In two companion cases announced the same day
as Miller, the Court explicitly adopted the Miller standard for use in prosecutions under
federal obscenity prosecutions as well. See United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 145 (1973);
United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Super 8mm Film, 413 U.S. 123, 130 (1973).
104 See Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1977).
1°' See Pope V. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 500-01 (1987); Miller, 413 U.S. at 34.
106
	
Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 157 (1974); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S.
87, 104-05 (1974).
1 ° 7 See Howling, 418 U.S. at 104-05 (holding that no such precise geographic area as an
actual state geography is required in jury instructions as a matter of law).
1 °8 See id. at 105.
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community: instead, juries may make determinations simply by relying
on the understanding of the community from which they come, which
potentially allows for an even narrower conception of community than
that provided for in the statewide reference endorsed in Milia 109
III. THE FCC's ADOPTION OF CONTEMPORARY COMMUNITY
STANDARDS
A. The Origins of Broadcast Indecency in the Pacifica Order
hi December, 1973, six months after the Supreme Court's decision
in Miller v. California, the Federal Communications Commission (the
"FCC" or the "Commission") received a listener's written complaint
concerning the afternoon broadcast on WIIAI-FM in New York of a pre-
recorded, twelve-minute monologue by the comedian George Carlin
consisting substantially of expletives— "the words you couldn't say on
the public . • . airwaves," according to Carlin's routine, "the ones you
definitely couldn't say."'" It was unclear what regulatory response, if
any, the FCC could make." Although under 18 U.S.C. § 1464 the
Commission had long held the apparent authority to issue sanctions for
the broadcast of "obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of
radio communication," the power had rarely been used and, at Ieast
with respect to indecency, had never been put to a constitutional test by
a reviewing court. 112 To begin with, it had not yet been established that
I" See 418 U.S. at 157.
to See Citizen's Complaint Against Pacifica Found. Station WBAI (FM) (Pacifica Order),
56 F.C.C.2d 94, 94-95 (1975), rev'd sub nom, Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.
1977), rev'd, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). The Pacifica Order characterized the Carlin monologue,
accurately, as "almost wholly devoted to the use of such words as 'shit' and 'fuck,' as well as
'cocksucker,"motherfucker,"piss'" and similar terms. Id. at 95.
nt Sec WUHY-FM, E. Educ. Radio Notice of Apparent Liability ( WUHY Notice), 24
F.C.C.2d 408, 412 (1970) (noting in the context of issuing a forfeiture notice for the
broadcast of "indecent" language that the FCC could find "no precedent, judicial or ad-
ministrative" for its action).
" 2 See 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2000); WUHY Notice, 24 F.C.C.2d at 412, 414. The statute pro-
vides that "[w]hoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio
communication shall be fined ... or imprisoned not more than two years, or both." 18
U.S.C. § 1464. Prior to evaluating the WBAI-FM listener complaint, the FCC had issued
only one previous sanction for an indecent broadcast, and that had come only three years
earlier in its 1970 WUHY Notice. See 24 F.C.C.2d at 912. In that proceeding, the FCC re-
viewed WUHY-FM's broadcast of a taped interview in which Jerry Garcia, a member of the
Grateful Dead, repeatedly interspersed his comments and reflections with the expletives
"fuck" and "shit" in order to determine if the hour-long broadcast should be penalized as
indecent broadcast speech. Id. at 908, 912. Proceeding cautiously and relying on the
Court's developing obscenity jurisprudence in Roth and the subsequent cases that su-tig-
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indecent language was truly distinguishable from obscene language
under the statute,'" and since the WBAI-FM broadcast tacked an ap-
peal to "prurience," it could not be argued that it was obscene." 4 This
uncertainty was of course further complicated by the fact that in the
unsettled period between Roth v. United States in 1959 and Miller in
1973, it had even been unclear what the Court would consider to be
obscene language. 115 The FCC's eventual response to the WBAI-FM
complaint, issued in its 1975 order in Citizen's Complaint Against Pacifica
Foundation Station. WBAI (FM) (Pacifica Order), was the Commission's
effort to settle these open issues and to assert its authority under § 1464
in a manner consistent with the Court's holding in Miller, which had
been issued less than two years earlier." 6
The Pacifica Order began by acknowledging that the term indecent
had never been authoritatively construed by the courts, but it noted
several lower court opinions entertaining the proposition that inde-
gled to clarify Roth's meaning, the Commission suggested, in IVUHY Notice, that in the
broadcast field, material should be considered indecent if it is "(a) patently offensive by
contemporary community standards; and (b) is utterly without redeeming social value." See
Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966); Roth v. United States, 359 U.S. 476,
489 (1957); IIVH1' Notice, 24 F.C.C.2d at 412. VIVID' Notice, however, provided no discus-
sion of whether community standards should be considered on a local or a national basis
or by reference to some other distinction. Sec 24 F.C.C.2d at 412. Finding that the broad-
cast in question violated its broad standard, the FCC issued the WURY-FM licensee a
nominal $100 fine, but the Commission was so uncertain of its authority under § 1464 that
it openly welcomed a judicial review of its action since it believed that only by judicial re-
view could the "pertinent standards" be determined. Id. at 414. The challenge never carne.
For a useful review of the limited circumstances prior to 1975 in which the FCC had
acted under § 1464's prohibition against the transmission of obscene and profane speech,
see Michael S. Sundermeyer, Filthy Words, the FCC, and the First Amendment: Regulating Broad-
cast Obscenity, 61 VA. L. REv. 579, 591-99 (1975).
" 3 See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 740-41; Pacifica  Order, 56 F.C.C.2d at 97; 111UHY Notice, 24
F.C,C.2d at 412. The respondent in Pacifica argued that obscenity and indecency are indis-
tinguishable under federal regulatory statutes and cited as authority justice Harlan's opin-
ion in Alanual Enterprises v. Day, which asserted that, in the context of restrictions on the
transmission of sexually explicit material in the U.S. mail under 18 U.S.C. § 1461, use of
the terms "lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile" must be taken as a whole to have a
meaning clearly limited to "the obscene." See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 740; Manual Enters. v.
Day, 370 U.S. 478, 482 (1962) (Harlan, J., announcing the judgment of the Court). The
FCC had considered this question and answered it the other way in issuing its order against
WBAI-FM. Sec Pacifica Order, 56 F.C.C.2d at 97; see also WUHY Notice, 24 F.C.C.2d at 412.
114 See Pacifica Order, 56 F.C.C.2d at 97; see also WW1' Notice, 24 F.C.C.2d at 912 (agree-
ing that the Jerry Garcia interview at issue in that proceeding was not obscene because it
did not make a dominant appeal to prurience or sexual matters).
113 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 20 (1973) (noting the "somewhat tortured his-
tory" of the Court's obscenity decisions in this period); id. at 22 n.3; Redrup v. New York,
386 U.S. 767, 770-71 (1967).
16 See 18 U.S.C. § 1464; Pacifica Order, 56 F.C.C.2d at 94, 97.
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cency had a meaning separate from obscenity in connection with
§ 1464 and therefore could be regulated in its own right. 117
 More cru-
cially, the Pacifica Order explained that because the definition of inde-
cency the Commission had hesitatingly relied upon in its sole, previous
action under § 1464 had depended on the Court's then-existing defini-
tion of obscenity, Miller's recent revision to obscenity law now necessi-
tated a reformulation of the Commission's conception of indecency. 118
The Pacifica Order cast its definition of indecency by tailoring
defmition of obscenity in two principal ways.'" First, the order
eliminated the requirement that the offending material appeal to the
"prurient interest," thus expanding the embrace of indecency beyond
content appealing primarily to the lustful appetite to encompass matters
relating to sexual or excretory acts or organs generally.I 20 Second, for
situations in which there is a reasonable chance that children may be in
the audience, the Pacifica Order-
 dispensed with the provision of Miller
that prohibited material could be redeemed if it could be found to hold
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."' Merit will not redeem the
merely indecent because the FCC's definition presumes that children
should always be shielded from content. that falls within its scope. 122 On
the remaining consideration of patent offensiveness, the Pacifica Order
modified Miller's contemporary community standards benchmark only
by inserting the qualifier "for the broadcast medium." 123
This reference to a particular standard "for the broadcast me-
dium" appears to follow from notions expressed elsewhere in the
Pacifica Order that, because of the medium's distinctive characteristics of
117
 See 18 U.S.C. § 1464; Pacifica Order, 56 F.C.C.2d at 97. These three cases concerned
criminal prosecutions brought by federal district attorneys, not by the FCC, for obscene,
indecent, or profane speech transmitted in two-way radio communication. See United
States v. Smith, 467 F.2d 1126, 1130 (7th Cir. 1972); Tallman v. United States, 465 F.2d 282,
286, 287 (7th Cir. 1972); Gagliardo v. United States, 366 F.2d 720, 725 (9th Cir. 1966).
Judge Tamm was critical of the FCC's use of these cases to support the distinction in his
opinion invalidating the FCC's policy when the controversy was before the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit. See Pacifica Found. v. FCC (Pacifica Appeal), 556
F.2d 9, 15 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev d, 438 U.S, 726 (1978).
118 See 18 U.S.C. § 1464; Pacifica Order, 56 F.C.C.2d at. 94, 97.
119 Compare Miller, 413 U.S. at 24, with Pacyica Order, 56 F.C.C.2d at 97. Under the
Pacifica Order's definition, indecency is language that "in terms patently offensive as meas-
ured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium [describes] sexual
or excretory activities and organs, at times of day when there is a reasonable risk that chil-
dren may be in the audience." 56 F.C.C.2d at 97.
l" See Pacifica Order, 56 F.C.C.2d at 97.
121 Sec id.
122 See id.
123 Id.
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ubiquity and intrusiveness, broadcast content may be evaluated by a
standard more restrictive than that applied to other media.I 24 The
Pacifica Order provided no explicit discussion as to whether the relevant
community to be considered in an indecency evaluation is local or na-
tional. 125 But given the degree to which the order depended on and
invoked Miller as authority, it is difficult to imagine that the Commis-
sion intended to ignore Millet's assessment that attempts to determine a
national standard would be both constitutionally unsound and "an ex-
ercise in futility. "126
Moreover, the FCC's efforts in the Pacifica Order to situate its newly
announced indecency policy within the context of its broader regula-
tory practices and responsibilities imply that community standards
should always be applied with reference to the specific, local commu-
nity served by the individual broadcast licensee.' 27 The Commission, for
instance, noted that it was issuing the Pacifica Order not only pursuant to
the prohibition against the broadcast of indecent speech in 18 U.S.C.
§ 1464, but also under its broad statutory obligation to promote the
larger and more effective use of radio in the public interest under 47
U.S.C. 303(g).' 28 This directly ties the FCC's regulation of indecency to
the goals and policies justifying the Commission's statutory grant of
regulatory authority. 129 Moreover, as the Commission went on to ex-
plain by directly citing its 1960 Programming Statement, its application of
the public interest criterion in the context of programming regulation
had always required as its principal criterion a consideration of the
"needs, interests and tastes" of the individual "community" each broad-
caster is licensed to serve.'"
124 See id. at 96-97 (explaining that, in view of broadcasting's intrusiveness and accessi-
bility to children, government content restrictions should not be subject to the same con-
stitutional analysis that might be appropriate for other, less intrusive forms of expression).
125 See Pacifica Order, 56 F.C.C.2d at 97, 98.
126 See Miller, 413 U.S. at 30, 32. The assumption that, under Miller, broadcast inde-
cency should properly be considered by reference to variable local standards certainly
seems to underlie Commissioner Quello's remark that broadcast of the Carlin monologue
would be unacceptable "[Wilder contemporary community standards anywhere in this
country." See Pacifica Order, 56 F.C.C.2d at 101 (statement of Commissioner Quello).
127 Sec 56 F.C.C.2d at 99.
128 See 18 U.S.C. § 1464; 47 U.S.C. § 303(g) (2000) (charging the FCC with the task of
generally encouraging the larger and more effective use of radio in the public interest");
Pacifica Order, 56 F.C.C.24 at 99.
129 See 47 U.S.C. § 303(g); Pacifica Order, 56 F.C.C.2d at 99.
150 See Pacifica Order, 56 F.C.C.2d at 99 (citing Network Programming Inquiry, 25 Fed.
Reg. 7291 (FCC Aug. 3, 1960)).
20081	 FCC's Community Standard for Indecency Determinations 	 1103
• Under the definition introduced in the Pacifica Order, the FCC de-
termined that WIIAI-FM's broadcast had violated § 1464. 131
 Pacifica
Foundation, the licensee of WBAI-FM, appealed the Commission's or-
der to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 132
The court of appeals reversed the Commission's order, holding that the
FCC's ruling constituted censorship of protected speech and that the
rule announced in the Pacifica Order was overbroad and vague.'" The
U.S. Supreme Court, however, reversed this decision in 1978 in FCC v.
Pacifica Foundation. 134
In upholding the FCC's authority to regulate the content of
broadcast speech in Pacifica, the Court extended a long line of deci-
sions that permitted goverment controls on broadcast speech, includ-
ing government licensing of speakers and prescriptive and proscriptive
content regulation, that would be clearly impermissible in any other
context. 135 These earlier cases had established, and Pacifica confirmed,
that the same phenomenon of spectrum scarcity that seemed to require
content-neutral government licensing of radio spectrum if broadcast-
ing were to function effectively at all also provided a constitutionally
acceptable basis for the FCC's regulation of broadcast program con-
tent. 136 "[O]f all forms of communication," the Court noted, It is
131 See 18 U.S.C. § 1464; Pacifica Order, 56 F.C.C.2d at 98. Recognizing that the finding
represented a change in policy, the Commission declined to impose a monetary sanction
in its declaratory order. Pacifica Order, 56 F.C.C.2d at 98. The Commission did note that the
order would be associated with the station's license file and would weigh in its determina-
tion of appropriate sanctions in any subsequent complaint. Id.
132
 Pacifica Appeal., 556 F.2d at 12. Pacifica Appeal thus brought the judicial review that
WUHY Notice had looked for but never received. See WUHY Notice, 24 F.C.C.2d at 414.
133 See Pacifica Appeal., 556 F.2d at 18. Among the more trenchant criticisms of the court
of appeals was judge Bazelon's observation that the Commission's method of determining
contemporary community standards was "chimerical": "The Conunission never solicited a
jury verdict or expert testimony. Nor did it rely on polls or letters of complaint. The Com-
mission simply recorded its conclusion that the words were indecent ...." Id. at 23 (Haze-,
Ion, j., concurring).
134 438 U.S. at 751.
133 See id. at 748-50; Red Lion Broad. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388-89 (1969); Nat'l Broad.
v. FCC, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943); see also FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S.
364, 376, 380 (1984) (extending this same rationale in a case that followed Pacifica). This
line of Supreme Court decisions has received particular criticism from at least one com-
menter. See Chen, supm note 10, at 1402-19.
136 See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 389 ("There is nothing in the First Amendment which pre-
vents the Government from requiring a licensee to share his frequency with others and to
conduct himself as a proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present those views and voices
which are representative of his community and which would otherwise, by necessity, be
barred from the airwaves."); Nat'l Broad., 319 U.S. at 226 ("Freedom of utterance is
abridged to many who wish to use the limited facilities of radio. Unlike other modes of
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broadcasting that has received the most limited First Amendment pro-
tection."' 37 Pacifica in fact asserted two new but related grounds for this
expanding regulatory regime: the Court held that government restric-
tions on indecent broadcast speech were justified because of the "un-
iquely pervasive presence" broadcasting holds in the culture and be-
cause the medium invades the home where it is "uniquely accessible" to
children)"
In upholding the Commission's action to sanction WBAI-FM un-
der § 1464 in Pacifica, the Supreme Court did not address the question
of whether the FCC should apply local or national standards in making
indecency determinations.'" The question of the appropriate commu-
nity standards on which to base indecency determinations (and in fact
the entire matter of the FCC's scope of authority under § 1464) lay un-
expression, radio inherently is not available to all. That is its unique characteristic, and
that is why, unlike other modes of expression, it is subject to governmental regulation.").
For a useful analysis of the history and logic of broadcasting's reduced protections
under the First Amendment, see generally William W. Van Alstyne, The Mdbius Strip of the
First Amendment: Perspectives on Red Lion, 29 S.C. L. REv. 539 (1978). The scarcity rationale
has beets frequently criticized as an inappropriate or illegitimate basis on which to distin-
guish among media in determining requisite levels of First Amendment protection. See,
e,g,, Donald E. Lively, 35 B.C. L. REv. 1067, 1074 (1994) (broadly dismissing reliance on
scarcity as representing "a misplaced concern and a principal discredit to medium-specific
[constitutional) analysis.").
"7 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748.
"II See id. at 748-49. Over the past thirty years, the uniqueness of broadcasting on these
two counts has been strongly questioned, and Pacifica more generally has been faulted as
perpetuating a constitutional "balkanization" of First Amendment jurisprudence under
which broadcast radio and television are illogically and unfairly accorded diminished First
Amendment protection relative to all other forms of communication. See Chen, stipm note
10, at 1394; lb°, supra note 10, at 248, 249, 293-94. The doctrinal limitations of Pacifica
may be undeniable when one observes that the Court has declined to extend Pacifica's
standard of relaxed scrutiny to its consideration of content-based regulation of cable tele-
vision or the internet, media that many contemporary observers find at least as "pervasive"
and "invasive" as broadcast radio and television. See Chess, supra note 10, at 1436-37; lb°,
supra note 10, at 298-301.
Time and technological development has in any event worked against the argument of
uniqueness advanced by Pacifica, at least with respect to broadcast television: today eighty-six
percent of American households receive television broadcasts by cable or satellite subscrip-
tion services. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 949, 465 (2d Cir. 2007), cert.
granted, 128 S. Ct. 1647 (2008); see also Ibo, supra note 10 at 279-83. The FCC may not re-
strict or sanction the delivery of indecent programming delivered to the household by cable
broadcast because provisions requiring cable operators to honor channel blocking requests
from individual households provide a less restrictive means of accomplishing the same goal
of restricting access to such programming by children. See United Sates v. Playboy Entm't
Group, 529 U.S. 803, 815 (2000).
"9 Sec 18 U.S.C. § 1964. See generally Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726.
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contested for the next decade because the FCC did not find another
broadcast indecent until 1987. 140
B. The FCC's Expansion of its Indecency Regime
In the decade following the Supreme Court's Pacifica decision,
the FCC's indecency policy operated on the understanding that only
broadcasts that used the specific words at issue in Pacifica in a context
closely resembling that of the Carlin monologue broadcast by WBAI-
FM would be found indecent."' In 1987, however, responding to a
perceived increase in objectionable broadcasts and concluding that
such a restricted enforcement policy was inconsistent with its duties
under § 1464, the FCC expanded the scope of what might be found
indecent to include material that violated the Commission's generic
definition of indecency, whether or not it closely resembled the spe-
cifics of the Carlin monologue at issue in Pacifica.' 42 This change in
practice commenced with the FCC's 1987 order in Infinity Broadcasting
Corp. of Pennsylvania (WYSP), which found a violation by WYSY-FM's
broadcast of the Howard Stern Show. 143
 In WYSP, the FCC rejected
the assertion by Infinity Broadcasting that the Stern broadcast could
not be found indecent because it dealt only in sexual innuendo and
did not employ the specific, offensive words at issue in Pacifica.
Commission insisted that a view so strictly limiting its authority under
§ 1464 was untenable. 145 Instead, the FCC maintained, each case re-
quires a review of the words broadcast and the context in which they
were broadcast in order to decide whether the Commission's inde-
cency test has been met.'"
Six months later, in response to requests by individual broadcast-
ers, industry trade groups, and other affected parties to clarify the
new policy adopted under WYSP and to explain its application of the
generic Pacifica definition, the FCC issued a new order, Infinity Broad-
casting col,. of Pennsylvania (Infinity), to outline more fully its view of
14° See 18 U.S.C. § 1464; Infinity Broad. Corp. of Pa. (IMP), 2 F.C,C.R. 2705, 2709
(1987).
141 See Pezeifica, 438 U.S. at 750 (emphasizing the narrowness of its holding); id, at 755-
56 (Powell, J., concurring); Fox, 489 F.3d at 448; Infinity Broad. Corp. of Pa. (Infinity), 3
F.C.C.R. 930, 930 (1987); WYSP, 2 F.C.C.R. at 2705.
142 See 18 U.S.C. § 1464; Infinity, 3 F.C.C.R. at 930, 931-32; WISP, 2 F.C.C.R. at 2706,
143 2 F.C.C.R. at 2705-06.
144 See id. at 2705.
' 45 See 18 U.S.C. § 1464; WISP, 2 F.C.C.R. at 2706.
146 See WISP, 2 F.C.C.R. at 2705-06.
144 The
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the relevant standards. 147 Infinity reflected not only an expansion of
the range of what might fall under the FCC's regulation of indecent
content but also a substantial.revision to the philosophy and legal rea-
soning that underlay the Pacifica Order twelve years earlier. 148
With respect to the FCC's indecency definition itself, Infinity ex-
plicitly rejected the local community as the authoritative source of
contemporary community standards,' 49 In explaining its evaluation of
"contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium," the
FCC deliberately turned away from the certainty of Miller and an-
nounced that, with respect to indecency violations under its applica-
tioq of § 1464, "[t] he determination reached is . . . not one based on
a local standard, but one based on a broader standard for broadcast-
ing generally.""° To justify this apparent divergence from Miller; the
FCC relied on an idiosyncratic reading of the Supreme Court's opin-
ion in Handing v. United States, which had been issued the year after
Miller; in 1974. 131 According to the FCC, Handing did not just provide
that a community smaller than an individual state could be refer-
enced by a jury to establish the appropriate standards; instead, Ham-
ling allowed the FCC to dispense with considerations of geography
altogether. 152 In making this claim, the FCC depended heavily on the
assertion in Handing that Miller's rejection of a national community
standard in obscenity determinations did not require the substitution
of some other "smaller geographical area" as a point of reference in
jury instructions."3 In fact, the FCC claimed, this meant that no ref-
erence to any "precise geographic area" was required at all." 4
Infinity explains that in place of the standards of a geographically
identifiable community, the FCC Commissioners rely upon their own
informed judgment as to whether "an average broadcast viewer or
teller" —a member of the contemporary broadcast community—would
find questioned material patently offensive. 153 In making this determi-
147 See Infinity, 3 F.C.C.R. at 931.
145 See id. at 933.
145 See id.
155 See 18 U.S.C. § 1464; 3 F.C.C.R. at 933.
151 See Flamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 104-05 (1974); Infinity, 3 F.C.C.R. at 933;
see also Feldman, supra note 23 at 386-87 (criticizing the FCC's reading of Handing as
strained and not legitimate).
152 See Infinity, 3 F.C.C.R. at 933.
155 See Mantling, 418 U.S. at 104; Infinity, 3 F.C.C.R. at 933.
151 Infinity, 3 F.C.C.R. at 933; see Handing, 418 U.S. at 104.
155 See Infinity, 3 F.C.C.R. at 933.
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nation, they draw on their knowledge of the views of the average viewer
or listener, as well as their "expertise in broadcast matters," 166
Broadcasters and civil liberties groups immediately challenged
the FCC's expansion of its indecency regime under Infinity in Action
for Children's Television u FCC in 1988 (ACT I), 157
 In that case, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that, al-
though it could consider other elements of the Commission's new
policy, as a lower court it was precluded from considering challenges
relating to the FCC's definition of indecency itself because the U.S.
Supreme Court had given broad endorsement to it in Pacifica. 158
Since issuing Infinity, the FCC has maintained the position that
the standards to be used in evaluating the offensiveness of broadcast
indecency are not local or otherwise determinable by reference to a
particular geographic area, but are instead those held by a more gen-
eral "broadcast community." 169
 In responding to administrative chal-
lenges to this interpretation, it has relied primarily on the general en-
dorsement of the Pacifica decision and the consequent refusal of the
D.C. Circuit to reconsider its definition in ACT L 160 Additionally, the
Commission now actively attempts to obscure the origins of its policy
in Miller by maintaining that Miller governs only obscenity cases and is
therefore "inapplicable to indecency, particularly broadcast inde-
cency. "161
156
 See id.; see also Infinity Radio Licensee, Inc., 19 F.C.C.R. 5022, 5026 (2004) (explain-
ing that the Commissioners keep abreast of contemporary community standards for the
broadcast medium through "constant interaction" with lawmakers, courts, broadcasters,
public interest groups, and ordinary citizens).
157 See Action for Children's Television v. FCC (ACT I), 852 F.2d 1332, 1338-39, 1344
(D.C. Cir. 1988). The challenge resulted in three more rulings over a period of seven
years, each of which confirmed the position that the Supreme Court's decision in Pacifien
precluded a finding that the FCC's indecency definition was unconstitutional. See Action
for Children's Television v. FCC (ACT IV), 59 F.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Action for
Children's Television V. FCC (ACT HI), 58 F.3d 654, 659 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Action for Chil-
dren's Television v. FCC (ACTH), 932 F.2d 1504, 1508 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
158
 See ACT I, 852 F.2d at 1338-39, 1344; see also ACT III, 58 F.3d at 659; ACT II, 932 F.2d
at 1508.
156 See Complaints Against Various Television Licensees Concerning Their Feb. 1, 2004
Broad. of the Super Bowl XXXVIII Halftime Show (Super Bowl), 21 F.C.C.R. 2760, 2762
n.17 (2006); Indus. Guidance on the Comm'n's Case Law Interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1464
and Enforcement Policies Regarding Broad. Indecency (2001 Indus. Guidance), 16 F.C.C.R,
7999, 8002 (2001); WPBN/WTOM License Subsidiary, Inc., 15 F.C.C.R. 1838, 1841 (2000);
Liability of Sagittarius Broad. Corp. (Sagittarius), 7 F.C.C.R. 6873, 6876 (1992).
160 See 2001 Indus. Guidance, 16 F.C.C.R. at 8000; Sagittarius, 7 F.C.C.R, at 6876 .
161 See Sagittarius, 7 F.C.C.R. at 6876. This assertion ignores the direct reliance on Miller
explicit in the Pacifica Order. See Pacifica Order, 56 F.C.C.2d at 94, 97. In something of a con-
tradiction given this assertion, the FCC simultaneously argues by citation to a footnote to
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C. The Issue of Institutional Capacity
In the twenty-one years since it issued Infinity, the FCC has never
explained why, against the presumption of Miller, the-standard it insists
upon for indecency determinations must be "not a local one." 162 The
single insight the Commission has allowed on this question arose in the
closely related context of an obscenity determination in the FCC's 1988
order in Video 44, an obscure ruling in which the FCC dismissed a chal-
lenge to the license renewal of a television broadcaster accused of vio-
lating § 1464 by its transmission of obscene programming under a sub-
scription broadcast arrangement. 163 Rejecting claims by the licensee
that Miller required the Commission to rely on local community stan-
dards in evaluating the obscenity charge, the FCC explained that differ-
ing institutional capacities justified the use of differing adjudicatory
standards.'" Miller and its progeny, the FCC explained, developed a
focus on local standards within the context of a judicial system capable
of using local fact finders in criminal prosecutions of obscenity. 165 By
contrast, the Video 44 obscenity determination arose in the context. of
an administrative action by a national agency that did not have access
to any similar means of local fact finding. 166 At least in the judgment. of
the 1977 U.S. Supreme Court opinion in Smith o. United States that, under Miller, the First
Amendment does not require the employment of a purely local standard in obscenity cases
in'any event. See Sagittarius, 7 F.C.C.R. at 6876 (citing Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291,
304 11.11 (1977) (noting that Miller held only that states could not be compelled to adopt a
national standard and expressing "no view" as to whether state or federal legislation may
require reference to a national standard)). Even the noncommittal posture of the footnote
may conflict with earlier case law: Handing read Miller to establish "as a matter of constitu-
tional law" that a juror may draw on knowledge of the "community or vicinage" from
which he comes in applying contemporary community standards. See Hanzling, 418 U.S. at
105. This view also seems to ignore the direct exhortation in Miller that obscenity is to be
determined by applying contemporary community standards, "not 'national standards.'"
See 413 U.S. at 37.
Paul Feldman further notes that even if the footnote in Smith leaves open the question
of whether the standard might be reformulated to reference a national standard, it also
indicates that it would be the role of Congress, not a regulatory agency, to change the
standard in federal statutes. See Feldman, supra note 22, at 388.
162 See 2001 Indus. Guidance, 16 F.C.C.R. at 8002; Infinity, 3 F.C.C.R. at 933.
163 Sec 18 U.S.C. § 1464; Video 44 (Video 44 II), 3 F.C.C.R. 757,758-59 (1988). For an
extended discussion of the history and implications of the Video 44 proceedings, see Feld-
man, supra note 23, at 389-92.
164 Video 44 II, 3 F.C.C.R. at 758-59.
See id.
16€ See id. The FCC considered but rejected alternative means of making a factual de-
termination of local community standards, such as the use of expert testimony, because
these were, in its view, "highly burdensome and of dubious reliability." See Video 44 (Video
441), 103 F.C.C.2d 1204,1206 (1986).
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the FCC, this difference distinguished its Video 44 review from the cir-
cumstances of the Miller line of cases and consequently relieved the
Commission of Miller's requirements, permitting the FCC instead to
apply a "broader contemporary' community standard for broadcasting
generally" in making a determination where an obscenity violation
might be charged. 167 Because Infinity and the Commission's subsequent,
indecency orders all consistently adopt the "broader contemporary
community standard for broadcasting generally" justified in Video 44,
one may assume that the argument concerning institutional incapacity
explains the Commission's reasoning with respect to indecency as
wel1. 168 In any event, local fact finding plays no part in the adjudication
of indecency complaints under § 1464, either in the Commission's ad-
ministrative review or in the course of the appeals process relied upon
by those aggrieved by a Commission ruling. 169
167 See Video 44 II, 3 F.C.C.R. at 758. Unstated but implicit in Video 44 II is the recogni-
tion expressed in the FCC's contradictory response to the same challenge less than two
years earlier that the Commission was practically reduced to its conclusion by the lack of
any institutional "mechanism" resembling a local jury for establishing legitimate local
community standards. See Video 44 I, 103 F.C.C.2d at 1206. Video 44 I took the institutional
incapacities of the FCC as a reason for exercising regulatory restraint in the face of poten-
tially compromised First Amendment rights. See id. (concluding that, as the FCC could not
rely on the determination of' a local jury familiar with local community standards, appro-
priate care for the First Amendment rights of licensees and the public dictated that the
FCC leave enforcement of § 1464's prohibition against obscenity to the discretion of local
prosecutors subject to the judgment of local juries). Changing its position in Video 44 II,
the FCC took these same incapacities as a justification for failing to provide the First
Amendment protections that were properly due, thus privileging considerations of admin-
istrative convenience over First Amendment rights. See Video 94 II, 3 F.C.C.R. at 758-59.
The result seems constitutionally unsatisfactory See Feldman, supra note 23 at 392; see also
Pacifica Appeal, 556 F.2d at 23 (Bazelon, J., concurring) (criticizing the FCC's "national"
standard as "chimerical" because it did not rely on a jury verdict, expert testimony, polls,
or letters of complaint).
16a See Video 44 II, 3 F.C.C.R. at 759: Infinity, 3 F.C.C.R. at 933. In fact, the Video 44 pro-
ceeding and the IVY.SP proceeding, which ultimately led to the Infinity ruling, moved si-
multaneously through the FCC administrative review process, and the respondents in each
case referenced the orders resulting from the other proceeding. See Video 44 II, 3 F.C.C.R.
at 758; WYSP, 2 F.C.C.R. at 2705 n.8.
169 See 18 U.S.C. § 1964; 97 U.S.C. §§ 402(a), 503(b) (3)—(4) (2000); ACT IV, 59 F.3d at
1253-56 (explaining the two routes open to a licensee interested in appealing an FCC
sanction under § 1469); see also AT&T Corp. v. FCC, 323 F.3d 1081,1083 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
As the ACT IV court pointed out, in practice the exclusive means by which the FCC im-
poses a forfeiture for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1464 is under 47 U.S.C. § 503 (b) (4). ACT IV,
59 F.3d at 1253. As the court's discussion reveals in ACT IV, the disincentives built into the
FCC's enforcement scheme mean that no broadcaster sanctioned under § 1464 ever goes
to trial on the merits of an FCC indecency determination. Id. at 1254. The sole fact finding
process is therefore the Commission's own administrative proceedings, and orders are
contested only to courts of appeals. Id. at 1253-54. Even in the unusual event that a broad-
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. THE MEANING AND VALUE OF CONTEMPORARY COMMUNITY
STANDARDS IN RECENT U.S. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
The U.S. Supreme Court has not decided a case concerning
broadcast indecency since FCC v. Pacifica Foundation in 1978. 170 Over
the last three decades, however, the Court has established a substantial
body of jurisprudence specifying the constitutional requirements of
obscenity and indecency regulations when they are applied to other,
nonbroadcast media, including telephone messaging services (i.e.,
"dial-a-porn"), cable television, and the Internet. 171 These decisions
provide two important guidelines for the consideration of contempo-
rary community standards in the context of broadcast indecency regu-
lation.'" First, as discussed in Section A of this Part, they establish that
what may have been, by the narrowest reading, only an allowance in the
Court's 1973 decision in Miller v. California has now become an inter-
pretive rule with positive constitutional weight: in the application of
statutes governing obscenity and indecency, the offensiveness of any
questioned material must be evaluated according to the standards of
the local community in which the inquiry arises)" Second, as ex-
plained in Section B of this Part, the Court's rulings on content regula-
tion over the last twenty years march in a consistent direction: toward
the requirement that decision making about controversial content be
caster subject to the licensing authority of the Commission refused to pay a forfeiture is-
sued by the FCC and thus forced a trial in connection with a civil recovery action, the
statutory scheme makes no allowance for a jury trial, the essential fact finding mechanism
in determining contemporary community standards in the context of obscenity. See 47
U.S.C. § 504(a) (2000); sec also Miller, 413 U.S. at 30.
170 Sec generally 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
171 See generally Ashcroft v. ACLU (Ashcroft II), 542 U.S. 656 (2004) (considering the con-
stitutionality of regulating certain forms of indecent expression on the Worldwide Web);
Ashcroft v. ACLU (Ashcroft 1 ), 535 U.S. 564 (2002) (same); United States v. Playboy Entm't
Group, 529 U.S. 803 (1999) (evaluating federal restrictions on the transmission of indecent
cable television programming on commercial cable channels); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844
(1997) (examining the constitutionality of federal restrictions on the transmission of inde-
cent content by means of the Internet); Denver Area Telecomms. Consortium v. FCC, 518
U.S. 727 (1996) (considering federal restrictions on the transmission of indecent program-
ming over certain public access cable channels); Sable Commc'ns. of Cal. v. FCC, 492 U.S.
115 (1989) (evaluating the constitutionality of statutes banning the transmission of obscene
or indecent messages by means of a national "dial-a-porn" service).
172 See infra notes 173-228 and accompanying text.
"5 See Ashcroft I, 535 U.S. at 580, 583; Reno, 521 U.S. at 874 n.39, 877-78; Denver Area,
518 U.S. at 753, 763; Sable, 492 U.S. at 124-25; Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 33, 37
(1973); see also Ashcroft I, 535 U.S. at 607 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining that "con-
temporary community standards" is a term of art that has taken on a particular meaning in
light of Court precedent).
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placed beyond the reach of government-backed, blanket prohibitions
and as close as possible to the "user end" of any medium. 174
 By requir-
ing that content regulations reflect the particular judgments of the in-
dividual communities they affect or proceeding further, by placing
control over such decisions directly in the individual citizen, the Court
has consistently affirmed the principle that among the fundamental
purposes of the First Amendment is its protection of choice. 176
A. The Interpretation of Contemporary Community Standards in Other Media
In Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium v. FCC, de-
cided in 1996, the Supreme Court evaluated the constitutionality of
three provisions of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992 that permitted private operators of local cable
television systems to restrict the transmission of indecent or "patently
offensive" content. 176
 The FCC had provided a definition of indecent
content under the statute by importing the language of its 1975 order
in Citizen's Complaint Against Pacifica Foundation. Station. WBAI (FM)
(Pacifica Order) . 177
 Although the case resulted in a fractured decision
that produced a majority opinion only with respect to one of the three
judgments, the opinions consistently interpreted "contemporary com-
munity standards" tinder the challenged provisions as referring to the
varying standards of individual, local communities subject to the Act's
174
 See Ashcroft II, 542 U.S. at 667; Playboy, 529 U.S. at 814-15, 818; Reno, 521 U.S. at
877-78; Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 754. 756-58; Sable, 492 U.S. at 130-31. Offering the model
of the Internet as the highest example of this kind of openness, Jim Chen characterizes
this approach as subscribing to an "end-to-end" logic of free speech jurisprudence. See
Chen, supra note 10, at 1364, 1454 (explaining that end-to-end design drives all intelli-
gence within a network or communications system to its edges "where speakers generate
ideas and audiences respond").
175 See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3t1 444, 465 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting
that the Court's recent First Amendment decisions go beyond a mere "mechanistic" appli-
cation of strict scrutiny to rely in part on "a notional pillar of free speech—namely,
choice"), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 1647 (2008); sec also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512
U.S. 622, 641 (1994) ("At the heart of the First Amendment lies the principle that each
person should decide for himself or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression,
consideration, and adherence,"); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) ("Mt is
largely because government officials cannot mike principled distinctions in this area that
the Constitution leaves matters of taste and style so largely to the individual.").
178 See Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 734-36.
177
 See id. (explaining that the standard prescribed by the FCC measured offensiveness
by contemporary community standards of "the cable viewing community"); Citizen's Com-
plaint Against Pacifica Found. Station WBAI (FM) (Pacifica Order), 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 97
(1975), rev'd sub nom. Pacifica Found. V. FCC, 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd, 438 U.S.
726 (1978).
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content controls."8 On this understanding, the Court upheld section
10(a) of the statute, which granted the operator of a local cable system
a right to prevent the transmission of indecent programming on cer-
tain channels leased by third parties. 179 The Court reasoned that be-
cause section 10(a) required reasonable judgment in restricting such
programming, a system operator would be constrained from blocking
transmission of content that was not indecent according to local com-
munity standards. 18° If a local court had declined to find similar mate-
rial patently offensive, the Court explained, or if a local authority over-
seeing public access channels had indicated that such material was not
offensive, a cable operator would have no reasonable basis to claim the
programming was indecent by the standards of that community; and
therefore an operator would be unable to deny the programming to a
community where it would find a receptive audience. 181 Following the
reasoning of Denver Area, then, local courts and similar panels of local
decision makers are authoritative sources of contemporary community
standards for cable television broadcasts because these groups express
the judgment of the individual, local community to which a restriction
potentially applies. 132
The Court's insistence on the value of local decision making in
enforcing contemporary community standards emerges with particular
clarity in its refusal to resolve the tension that has arisen between the
national distribution enabled by newer forms of electronic media and
the rule of localism embodied in Mille: 183 In 1989, in Sable Communica-
tions of California v. FCC, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a fed-
eral statute banning the interstate transmission of obscene commercial
telephone messages (i.e., "dial-a-porn") under the rule it had an-
nounced in 1957 in Roth v. United States that obscene speech is not pro-
tected by the First Amendment. 184 Because under the statute a com-
mercial provider of sexually explicit messages could be prosecuted in
any community in which its transmissions might be found obscene, the
appellant in Sable had argued that the law subjected its nationally avail-
178 See Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 753, 763.
"9 Sec id. at 753.
188 See id.
181 See id.
182 See id. at 753, 763 (applying the same reasoning to invalidate section 10(c) of the
challenged statute because it permitted private cable system operators to contravene the
programming decisions of locally constituted boards).
183 See Ashooft I, 535 U.S. at 580, 583; Reno, 521 U.S. at 874 n.39, 877-78; Sable, 492 U.S.
at 125-26.
184 See Sable, 492 U.S. at 124; Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
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able service to a national standard of obscenity as the content of the
messages it provided would now be subject to prohibition according to
the standards of the nation's least tolerant cominunity. 185 The Court
rejected this argument, holding that the Constitution poses no barrier
to prohibiting communications that are obscene in some communities
under local standards even though they are not obscene in others, par-
ticularly when, as here, screening technology would permit a message
provider to tailor its messages, on a selective basis, to the standards of
the individual communities it chose to serve. 186 Sable thus reflected the
Court's continuing commitment to reliance on a local determination
of contemporary community standards, even when these standards are
applied to a medium that is national in scope. 187
In 1997, in Reno v. ACLU, the Court once again considered, in the
context of indecency, the .burden that the use of local standards might
place on content distributed through a nationally focused medium. 188
In Reno, the Court held that two provisions of the Communications De-
cency Act of 1996 (the "CDA"), intended to protect minors from expo-
sure to indecent material on the Internet, unconstitutionally abridged
the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech because they did not
employ the least restrictive means possible but instead imposed an
"open-ended" prohibition on protected speech.' 89 Like the cable televi-
sion provisions at issue in Denver Area, the CDA imported the exact lan-
guage of the Pacifica Order to define indecent content. 190
185 See Sable, 492 U.S. at 124.
1136 See id. at 125-26; see also Hamling v United States, 418 U.S. 87, 106 (1974) (holding
that the fact that distributors of allegedly obscene materials may be subjected to varying
community standards as a consequence of distributing their materials into multiple federal
judicial districts does not render a federal statute unconstitutional because of the failure of
application of uniform national standards of obscenity).
187
 See Sable, 492 U.S. at 124-25. The Court went on to note, in language directly rele-
vant to the issue of contemporary community standards in broadcasting tinder the regula-
tions of 18 U.S.C. § 1464, that the statute challenged in Sable no more establishes a 'na-
tional standard' of obscenity than do federal statutes prohibiting the mailing of obscene
materials or the broadcasting of obscene messages." Id.
188 See generally 521 U.S. 844.
180 See id. at 877, 879.
180 See Communications Decency Act (the "CDA") of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104,
§§ 501-502, 110 Stat. 56, 133-36, invalidated by Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (crimi-
nalizing the transmission of obscene or indecent messages to any recipient under eighteen
years of age and prohibiting the knowing sending or displaying to a person under eight-
een years of age of any message "that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently
offensive as measured by contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activi-
ties or organs"); see also Pacifica Order, 56 F.C.C.2d. at 97.
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Central to the Court's holding in Reno was its judgment that the
CDA's reliance on contemporary community standards as a bench-
mark of offensiveness posed a particular risk when combined with the
nationwide accessibility of the Internet. 191 Because standards vary by
community, but material on the Internet is available nationally, the
CDA's indecency definition effectively allowed a finding of "patent
offensiveness" by the nation's least tolerant community to suppress a
large amount of speech that adults in more tolerant communities had
a right to receive and to address to one another) 92 The Court's invali-
dation of the CDA thus depended on its acceptance that under the
borrowed Pacifica indecency definition, contemporary community
standards must mean standards determined by a local community. 193
When applied to a medium that, in contrast to the telephone message
service of Sable, could not be effectively "blocked" to prevent distribu-
tion to less tolerant communities, the CDA's reliance on local stan-
dards imposed just the sort of burden that the Court had sought to
eliminate by advocating a rule of varying local community standards
for obscenity determinations in its 1973 decision in Mittel: 194 To adopt
the language of Miller, the Reno Court in effect concluded that it was
"neither realistic nor constitutionally sound" to require that the peo-
ple of "Las Vegas, or New York City" be limited to public depictions
found acceptable by "the people of Maine or Mississippi." 195
Taking the Court's broad criticisms of the CDA to heart, when
Congress next attempted to regulate indecent content on the Internet
with the Child Online Protection Act of 1998 ("COPA"), it substantially
narrowed the reach of its efforts. 196 Most significantly, COPA aban-
191 See Reno, 521 U.S. at 877-78.
192 See id. at 874,877-78.
19' See id. at 877-78. The Court in fact makes a point of tracing the statute's "contem-
porary community standards language" directly to Miller in order to dismiss the govern-
ment's assertion that the CDA was intended to establish a uniform national standard of
content regulation. See id at 874 n.39.
184
	 if at 877-78: Miller, 413 U.S. at 32. Afiller noted the risk inherent in a national
standard that material found tolerable in some places but not under the national criteria
would, as a result, be unavailable where it would be acceptable. See 413 U.S. at 32 n.13; see
also Manual Enters. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 488 (1962) (condemning as "intolerable" any
standard that would deny some sections of the country access to material, there deemed
acceptable, simply because it is considered offensive to community standards prevailing in
another part of the country).
195 See Reno, 521 U.S. at 877-78; Miller, 413 U.S. at 32.
196 See 47 U.S.C. § 231 (2000), held unconstitutional by ACLU v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 181
(3d Cir. 2008), affg ACLU v. Gonzales, 478 F. Stipp, 2d 775 (E.D. Pa. 2007), on remand from
Ashcroft II, 542 U.S. 656; Ashcroft I, 535 U.S. at 569-70. In contrast to the CDA, the Child
Online Protection Act ("COPA") applied only to material posted on the Worldwide Web,
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dolled the broad indecency definition of the Pacifica Oilier and fash-
ioned a more limited definition of indecency that relied closely on the
narrow obscenity definition established in Miller; thereby substantially
reducing the amount of material encompassed by its restrictions. 197 Fol-
lowing Miller; however, COPA provided (as the CDA had) that the criti-
cal determination of patent offensiveness would be determined by ref-
erence to contemporary community standards. 08
In 2002, in Ashcroft v. ACLU (Ashcroft I), the Supreme Court re-
versed a decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit to
uphold a preliminary injunction restraining enforcement of COPA. 199
A plurality of the Court determined that, in the context of a facial chal-
lenge, COPA's reliance on contemporary community standards to iden-
tify indecent content on the Worldwide Web that is harmful to minors
did not, by itself, render the statute overbroad under the First Amend-
men - . 200t According to the plurality, this was true even though the effect
of COPA was to apply varying local standards to content transmitted by
covered only communications made for commercial purposes, and restricted only material
"harmful to minors." Compare COPA, 47 U.S.C. § 231, with CDA, 110 Stat. at 133-36.
07 See Ashcroft I, 535 U.S. at 570, 578-79. COPA modified Miller's three elements to
specify that prurience and patent offensiveness would be judged "with respect to minors"
and that material violating these first two elements would be redeemed only if the work
taken as a whole had serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value "for minors." 47
U.S.C. § 231 (e)(6), held unconstitutional by Multascy, 534 F.3d 181, aff'g Gonzales, 478 F.
Stipp. 2d 775, on remand from Ashcroft II, 542 U.S. 656; Ashcroft I, 535 U.S. at 570. The effect
of the definition was to extend COPA's coverage somewhat beyond the "obscene" to reach
what was otherwise only legally "indecent" because it technically covered an area of con-
tent that extended marginally beyond what may be found obscene under Aliller: See Ashcroft
1, 535 U.S. at 578-79; see also Ashcroft II, 542 U.S. at 679-80 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (ac-
knowledging that the definition of harmful material in COPA "read literally, insofar as it
extends beyond the legally obscene, could reach only borderline cases"). COPA intro-
duced the term "harmful material" to refer to this narrow slice of indecent content, pre-
sumably in order to distinguish it front the broader field of indecency as a whole. See
Ashcroft I, 535 U.S. at 579 (observing that, in contrast to indecency, the "harmful material"
restricted under COPA must appeal to the prurient interest, which requires that it be in
some sense erotic).
194 See 47 U.S.C. § 231(e) (6), held unconstitutional by Multasey, 534 F.3d 181, aff 'g Gonza-
les, 478 F. Supp. 2d 775, on remand from Ashcroft II, 542 U.S. 656; Ashcroft I, 535 U.S. at 570.
' 99 Ashcroft I, 535 U.S. at 586.
29° See id. at 585; see also Sable, 492 U.S. at 126 (holding that under a statute prohibiting
the transmission of obscene telephone messages, it did not violate the First Amendment to
require the national distributor of such messages to conform to standards that might vary
by community, particularly when the message provider is free to tailor its messages to the
communities it chooses to serve).
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a national (or international) medium whose distribution could not be
directed only to communities open to receiving controversial content."'
Although the result of the Court's ruling in Ashouft /was to some
degree a reversal of Reno, its understanding and application of com-
munity standards with respect to Internet indecency are consistent with
the earlier opinion.202 hi both cases, the community standard to be ap-
plied in the indecency determination is local. 205 Ashcroft I conflicts with
Reno only because it concludes, for purposes of resolving a facial chal-
lenge, that requiring a speaker disseminating material to a national au-
dience to observe varying community standards does not, by itself, vio-
late the First Amendment. 204 The Court was helped to this result by the
narrowness of COPA's scope of coverage. 2°5 Indeed, the Court recon-
ciled the apparent conflict between the two cases by explaining that the
enormous breadth of material potentially encompassed by the inde-
cency definition of the CDA at issue in Reno had the effect of magnify-
ing the impact caused by differences in community standards across the
country but that this problem was eliminated by the tighter limits of
COPA's defuntion. 206 In neither case, however, did the Court express
any doubt that the relevant community from which to draw standards
for indecency determinations is the local community; in fact, it is the
certainty of this rule as it intersects with the national or nonlocal nature
of the medium at issue in Reno and Ashcroft I that gives rise to the legal
challenges the Court must in each case resolve. 207
201 See Ashcroft 1, 535 U.S. at 585. The plurality opinion explicitly recognized that due to
technological limitations, and unlike the commercial telephone message operator of Sable,
a Web publisher is unable to control the geographic distribution of his or her communica-
tions. See id. at 575, 595-96 (Kennedy,,)., concurring) (noting that "it is easy and cheap to
reach a worldwide audience on the Internet ... but expensive if not impossible to reach a
geographic subset," and therefore a Web publisher in a more tolerant community, inter-
ested in speaking only to his neighbors, may find that "an eavesdropper in a more tradi-
tional, rural community" has become "the arbiter of propriety on the Web").
202
	 Ashcroft I, 535 U.S. at 583-85, with Reno, 521 U.S. at 877-78, 885,
2" See Ashcroft I, 535 U.S. at 575, 583-84; Reno, 521 U.S. at 874 n.39, 877-78.
2" See Ashcroft I, 535 U.S. at 578, 585. The ruling thus appears to work a revision to the
logic of Sable because, hi the context of the Worldwide Web, the risk to the content pro-
vider of varying local standards cannot be mitigated by careful blocking to prevent distri-
bution to less tolerant communities, See id. at 575 n.6, 582; Sable, 492 U.S. at 125-26. But see
Ashcroft 1, 535 U.S. at 582 (opinion of Thomas, J.) (asserting that the operator's ability to
block transmission of calls to particular areas was not the basis of the Court's decision in
Sable but only referenced as "a supplemental point").
2" See Ashcroft I, 535 U.S. at 578, 585.
206 See id. at 578.
207 See id.; Reno, 521 U.S. at 874 n.39, 877-78. The three justices not joining the plural-
ity opinion in Ashcroft I but concurring in the result also recognized that Miller and its
progeny require that the term "contemporary community standards," whether applied
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B. Contemporary Community Standards and the First
Amendment Value of Choice
In his dissent in Ashcroft I, Justice Stevens reminded the Court that
its traditional reliance on local community standards to differentiate
between permissible and impermissible speech has historically pro-
tected the interests of audience members as much as the interests of
speakers. 2D8
 Reliance on varying community standards protects the in-
terests of audience members by allowing people to "self-sort" based on
their preferences: selecting a community in which to live is one way a
citizen chooses the sort of content that he or she is willing to tolerate or
prohibit. 209
 This is one manner in which the Court's dedication to local
community standards supports the Court's larger commitment to
choice as a critical component of First Amendment rights. 210
Choice exercised on the terms Justice Stevens describes can oper-
ate only if the law permits and upholds the varying decisions about
content made by juries or similar representative bodies charged with
applying the standards of the individual, local communities whose views
they represent.211
 The Court struck down a second provision of the ca-
under indecency or obscenity statutes, requires a local determination. See Ashcroft I, 535
U.S. at 597 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (acknowledging that the national
variation in community standards imposes "a particular burden" on Internet speech); id. at
605-06 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (observing that the effect of criminalizing a particular
communication under the illiberal community standards of just a handful of destinations
will be to prohibit transmission of the message to the millions of Americans with access to
the Internet who may wish to receive such a communication). But see id. at 587 (O'Connor,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (advocating the introduction of a
national standard for application to the Internet); id. at 590 (Breyer, J„ concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) (arguing that Congress intended the application of a
national standard under the statute at issue).
208 See 535 U.S. at 612 (Stevens, J. dissenting). By aggregating community values, these
standards protect speakers by providing some predictability as to what constitutes offensive
speech and guaranteeing that controversial speech will not be subject to prohibitions im-
posed by the least tolerant members of society. See id.
209 Id. ("Those who abhor and those who tolerate sexually explicit speech can seek out
like-minded people and settle in communities that share their views on what is acceptable
for themselves and their children.").
21° See Ashcroft II, 542 U.S. at 667; Playboy, 529 U.S. at 814, 818; Reno, 521 U.S. at 877-
78; Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 754, 756-58, 763; Sable, 492 U.S. at 130-31; Fox, 489 F.3d at 465.
Moral and aesthetic judgments about art, literature, and popular culture '`are for the indi-
vidual to make, not for the Government to decree, even with the mandate or approval of a
majority." Playboy, 529 U.S. at 818. This repeats the observation of the Court in Cohen that
It is largely because governmental officials cannot make principled distinctions in this
area that the Constitution leaves matters of taste and style so largely to the individual." 403
U.S. at 25.
2" See Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 753, 763; Sable, 492 U.S. at 126; Miller, 413 U.S. at 32 (It
is neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to read the First Amendment as requiring
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ble television statute at issue in Denver Area precisely because it violated
this rule. 212 Section 10(c) of the statute had authorized an individual
cable system operator to prevent transmission of indecent program-
ming over public access channels that had previously been subject to
supervision only by community boards established by municipalities
holding rights to such channels under long-standing cable franchise
agreements.213 Because these bodies were, like a jury, a reliable source
of contemporary community standards, their approval of programming
expressed a decision by the local community that such content was ac-
ceptable.2" A programming veto imposed by a cable operator exercis-
ing the right provided by section 10(c) would therefore contravene the
judgment of a locally accountable body making content decisions in a
manner consistent with Millet:215 The result would be to prohibit deliv-
ery of programming to citizens wishing to receive such content and re-
siding in a community where it had been deemed acceptable, a conse-
quence Miller presumed to prohibit by establishing the unique standard
of the individual community, as the effective gauge of acceptability. 216
Where possible, the principle of choice that underwrites the
Court's endorsement of local standards requires that decisions about
controversial content be pushed even further out, beyond the collec-
tive judgment of the local community and into the hands of the indi-
vidual citizen making his or her own decision independent of any
government limitation or restriction. 217 In Reno, for instance, the
Court was helped to its conclusion that the CDA did not employ the
least restrictive means possible to protect minors from exposure to
indecent material on the Internet by its observation that "user-based
software" was rapidly being introduced that would allow parents to
filter offensive material according to their own judgment and con-
trol. 218 In 2004, two years after Ashcroft I, the Court extended this rea-
that the people of Maine or Mississippi accept public depiction of conduct found tolerable
in Las Vegas, or New York City:).
212 See 518 U.S. at 763.
2" See id. at 760-62.
214 See id. at 763.
215 See id.; Miller, 413 U.S. at 30.
216 See Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 763; Miller, 413 U.S. at 32 & n.13. This decision making
is consistent with the reasoning under which the Court upheld § 10(a) of the same statute.
See supra notes 176-182 and accompanying text.
217 See Ashcroft II, 542 U.S. at 667; Playboy, 529 U.S. at 814-15, 818; Reno, 521 U.S. at
877; Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 754, 756-58; Sable, 492 U.S. at 130-31; see also Chen, supra
note 10, at 1364, 1454 (explaining that an end-to-end model of networked communica-
tion, typified by the Internet, offers the greatest degree of user-based decision making).
216 See 521 U.S. at 876-77.
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soning in Ashcroft v. ACLU (Ashcroft II) when it addressed COPA on
new grounds and affirmed a preliminary injunction against the stat-
ute under the view that COPA placed an impermissible burden on
constitutionally protected speech. 2 t 9
 The filtering software anticipated
in Reno was widely available by the time of Ashcroft II, and the Court
concluded that it provided a less restrictive and more effective means
of protecting children from harmful material than the blanket prohi-
bitions of COPA. 220 The primary reason that software filters are a su-
perior solution to the CDA, or even to the more narrowly tailored
COPA, is because they allow selective, household-by-household restric-
tions on content at "the receiving end" rather than "universal restric-
tions at the source."221
 Adults who are interested in material that is
indecent but not obscene may thus freely choose to access this mate-
rial without the interference of government regulation. 222
The Court's decisions with respect to the desirability of receiving
end decision-making in the context of the Internet in Ashcroft II and
Reno are consistent with its contemporary holdings on the regulation of
indecent content in the context of cable television and telephone "dial-
a-porn" service. 223
 Although the Court upheld the statutory provision
prohibiting the transmission of obscene telephone messages in Sable,
for instance, in the same opinion it invalidated a companion provision
that established a blanket ban on messages that were not obscene but
only indecent and therefore protected under the First Amendment. 224
In 2000, in United States v. Playboy Entertainment, the Court struck down a
similar provision of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 that required
cable television operators providing subscription channels dedicated to
sexually oriented programming to restrict their. transmission of such
channels to nighttime hours. 225
 In each case, the Court allowed that the
"9 See Ashcroft II, 542 U.S. at 667,670,
220 See id. at 667-68.
221 See id.
222 Sec id.
233 See Playboy, 529 U.S. at 815; Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 756-58; Sable, 492 U.S. at 130-31.
244  See Sable, 492 U.S. at 126,130-31.
223 See 529 U.S. at 806-07,827. The statute required that cable operators limit this pro-
gramming to "safe harbor" nighttime hours if their technical facilities did not allow them
to scramble the signal in a manner that would guarantee that the programming would riot
be intermittently received by nonsubscribing households where children might be present.
See id. at 806-07. Since the majority of cable facilities could riot satisfy the scrambling re-
quirement, operators were obliged to conform to the statute's time-channeling provision,
with the effect that no household in an affected service area could receive the covered
programming for two-thirds of the day, whether or not the household or the viewer wanted
to do so. See id. at 807. This was a burden that significantly restricted "communication be-
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government had a legitimate interest in protecting children from expo-
sure to indecent content, but in neither did it find the legislation suffi-
ciently narrowly drawn to serve that purpose without infringing on the
rights of adults wishing to access such con tent. 226 The Court found that
both situations might have been addressed under approaches that re-
stricted access to adults on a user-by-user or household-by-household
basis, thus leaving discretion in the hands of the individual citizen
rather than placing control over content in the federal government. 227
Where reliance on the discretion of the individual citizen presents an
effective solution to a government purpose, the Playboy Court stated,
the Constitution requires that government refrain from imposing cen-
tralized control and defer to individual choice: moral and aesthetic
judgments about art, literature, and popular culture "are for the indi-
vidual to make, not for the Government to decree, even with the man-
date or approval of a majority."228
V. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROBLEMS WITH THE FCC's
USE OE COMMUNITY STANDARDS
A. Inconsistencies Raised by the FCC's Use of Contemporary
Community Standards
The arguments the Federal Communications Commission (the
"FCC" or the "Commission") has relied on since rejecting local com-
munity standards in indecency determinations in 1987, in Infinity Broad-
casting Corp. of Pennsylvania (Infinity), in favor of "a broader standard for
tween speakers and willing adult listeners," the Court concluded. See id. at 812. Citing Reno
and Sable, the Court found the burden impermissible given the fully effective and less re-
strictive alternative of requiring cable operators to provide complete "blocking" of scram-
bled channels in response to consumer requests on a household-by-household basis. See id.
at 814-15,
In Denver Area, the Court struck down the third challenged provision of the statute on
the same reasoning applied in Playboy, See Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 756-58. Section 10(b)
required cable system operators to block access to indecent programming on leased access
channels, providing that the channels could be unblocked only after a subscriber's written
request for access. See id, at 753. According to the Court, the provision removed autonomy
of decision making from potential viewers of the affected programs and was unduly bur-
densome when the alternative of providing interested subscribers with cable lock-boxes"
to restrict the programming would accomplish the same goal of protecting children from
sexually explicit programming. See id. at 756-58.
226 See Playboy, 529 U.S. at 815; Sable, 492 U.S. at 130-31.
227 See Playboy. 529 U.S. at 815; Sable, 492 U.S. at 130-31.
228 See playboy, 529 U.S. at 818; see also Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25 ("Lilt is largely because
government officials cannot make principled distinctions in this area that the Constitution
leaves matters of taste and style so largely to the individual.").
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broadcasting generally"229
 cannot be squared with the Supreme Court's
treatment of contemporary community standards as they apply to inde-
cency regulations in nonbroadcast media. 230
 Over the last twenty years,
the Court has clearly established that the directive of its 1973 decision
in Miller v. California applies to indecency determinations. 231
 The FCC's
assertion that the Miller speaks only to obscenity and is inapplicable to
indecency therefore can no longer be maimained. 232
 Yet the FCC re-
mains intransigent. 233 This posture is indefensible when one considers
that the Court's determination of the meaning of contemporary com-
munity standards for indecency regulation has repeatedly arisen in its
review of statutes that import the very language relied upon by the
FCC, and originally formulated in its 1975 order in Citizen's Complaint
Against Pacifica Foundation Station WBAI (FM) (Pacifica Order) ,234
 to de-
fine broadcast indecency under 18 U.S.C. § 1464. 235
The FCC has attempted to maintain the legitimacy of its aberrant
interpretation by asserting that the Supreme Court's decision to up-
hold its action in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation in 1978 served as a broad
endorsement of the Commission's broadcast indecency definition as a
whole, thereby making any part of it unassailable under principles of
stare decisis, 236 But the Court's Pacifier] decision did not consider the
229
 Infinity Broad. Corp. of Pa. (Infinity), 3 F.C.C.R. 930, 933 (1987).
23°
	 Ashcroft v. ACLU (Ashcroft I), 535 U.S. 569, 580, 583 (2002); Reno v. ACLU, 521
U.S. 844, 874 n.39, 877-78 (1997); Deliver Area Telecommc'ns Consortium v. FCC, 518
U.S. 727, 753, 763 (1996); Sable Commc'ns of Cal. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 124-25 (1989);
Miller v. California, 913 U.S. 15, 33, 37 (1973); sec also Ashcroft I, 535 U.S. at 607 n.3, 612
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
231 Sec Ashcroft I, 535 U.S. at 580, 583; Reno, 521 U.S. at 879 n.39, 877-78; Denver Area,
518 U.S. at 753, 764; Sable, 992 U.S. at 124-25; Miller, 413 U.S. at 33, 37; see also Ashcroft I,
535 U.S. at 607 n.3, 612 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
232 See Indus. Guidance on the Commn's Case Law Interpreting 18. U.S.C. § 1469 and
Enforcement Policies Regarding Broad. Indecency (2001 Indus. Guidance), 16 F.C.C.R.
7999, 8002 (2001); Sagittarius Broad. (Sagittarius), 7 F.C.C.R. 6873. 6876 (1992).
233 See Complaints Against Various Television Licensees Concerning Their Feb. 1, 2004
Broad. of the Super Bowl XXXVIII Halftime Show (Super Bowl), 21 F.C.C.R. 2760, 2763
n.17 (2006); 2001 Indus. Guidance, 16 F.C.C.R. at 8002 n.15; WPBN/W1'OM License Sub-
sidiary, Inc. ( WPM), 15 F.C.C.R. 1838, 1841 (2000); Sagittarius, 7 F.C.C.R. at 6876.
234 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 97 (1975), mid sub nom. Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9 (D.C.
Cir. 1977), rev d, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
2" See 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2000); Reno, 521 U.S. at 860; Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 734, 736;
Sable, 492 U.S. at 121 (explaining the legislative and regulatory history of the regulations at
issue); Carlin Commc'ns v. FCC, 749 F.2d 113. 116 & n.7 (2d Cir. 1984) (confirming that
the FCC's indecency definition in the Pacifica Order provided the legal standard for a viola-
tion of the statute).
239 See 2001 Indus, Guidance, 16 F.C.C.R. at 8000; Sagittarius, 7 F.C.C.R. at 6876. Lower
courts have reluctantly agreed with the FCC on the rare occasions they have been pre-
sented with challenges to the FCC's definition of indecency. See Fox Television Stations,
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FCC's rejection of local standards and so could not approve it; indeed,
the FCC did not adopt its anomalous, nonlocal standard ("based on a
broader standard for broadcasting generally") until it significantly
modified its use of the Pacifica definition to expand its indecency re-
gime in 1987. 237
 That the Pacifica Court in 1978 would have interpreted
"contemporary community standards" as necessarily referencing the
mores of an identifiable local community seems all but incontrovertible
given that Miller had only five years earlier put to rest a decade and a
half of Supreme Court controversy on the question as it related to ob-
scenity determinations. 238 If any uncertainty remained, the Court could
hardly have ignored the FCC's direct reliance on Miller in the Pacifica
Onler: the Miller decision served as both the occasion and the authority
Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 464-66 (2d Cir. 2007) (observing that whatever merits argu-
ments against Pacifica may have, "they cannot sway us in light of Supreme Court prece-
dent," though expressing skepticism that the FCC's indecency test could now survive a
First Amendment challenge), cert. granted. 128 S. Ct. 1647 (2008); Action for Children's
Television v. FCC (ACT II! ). 58 F.3d 654, 659 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Action for Children's Tele-
vision v. FCC (ACT II), 932 F.2d 1504, 1508 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Action for Children's Televi-
sion v. FCC (ACT 1), 852 F.2d 1332, 1338-39, 1344 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (welcoming, however,
a "correction" from "Higher Authority" if the court had misunderstood the apparent en-
dorsement of Pacifica).
237 See Infinity, 3 F.C.C.R. at 933.
218 See Miller, 413 U.S. at 37 (holding that obscenity is to be determined by applying the
contemporary community standards of an actual community "not 'national standards'").
The FCC tries to evade the directness of Miller by relying on an idiosyncratic reading
of the Supreme Court's 1974 opinion in Handing v. United States to justify a nonlocal stan-
dard. See Infinity, 3 F.C.C.R. at 933 (citing Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 104-05
(1974)). It is open to question if the FCC's reading of Handing is fair and complete. See
Feldman, supra note 23 at 386-87 (characterizing the FCC's application of Hamling as ille-
gitimate). Although Handing allowed that instructions issued to jurors sitting in obscenity
cases need not make reference to any particular community as the source of determining
standards, that provision was made within the context of the broader rule of Miller and the
cases that immediately followed it. See Handing, 418 U.S. at 105. Taken together, Millerand
Handing establish that as a matter of constitutional law, no formulation of jury instructions
may be issued that would prevent individual jurors train making reference to the standards
of the particular geographic "community or vicinage" from which he or she comes in ap-
plying "contemporary community standards." Sec id.; Miller, 413 U.S. at 37. Thus, a rule
that operated to prevent consultation of these local standards—as the FCC arguably does
in asserting that its standard is "not a local one" —would seem to contradict the holdings
of both Miller and Haunting. See Handing, 418 U.S. at 105; Miller, 413 U.S. at 37.
Feldman also makes the convincing argument that by making its standard that of
"broadcasting generally," the FCC unavoidably winds up relying on a national standard. See
Feldman, supra note 23 at 381-82. Because "broadcasting generally" occurs in every major
community in the United States, the "average listener" is logically the average of the entire
nation; hence, the FCC's standard is undeniably national. See id. As a result, the FCC's use
of a contemporary community standard for "broadcasting generally" violates the rule of
Miller See 413 U.S. at 37; see also Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 292-93 (1977) (recall-
ing that in Miller the Court "rejected a plea for a uniform national standard").
2008]	 FCC's Community Standard for Indecency Determinations
	 1123
for the FCC's announcement of a distinct indecency policy under
§ 1464 in the Pacifica Order239
 Finally, even putting aside the FCC's mis-
representations of what the Court might have held in Pacifica, the
Commission's reliance on Pacifica ignores the fact that the portion of
the opinion approving the FCC's "construction of the statutory lan-
guage of § 1464"—that is, its indecency definition—garnered the sup-
port of only a three-justice plurality. 24° The Pacifica indecency definition
itself stands on shaky constitutional ground."'
The FCC's rejection of local community standards for broadcast
indecency determinations not only conflicts with Supreme Court de-
cisions regarding telephone messaging services, cable television, and
the Internet, but is also plainly illogical on its own terms given the lo-
cal, geographically bounded nature of the conventional broadcast
medium.242
 It is a commonplace of the Court's First Amendment ju-
risprudence that, in the words of its 1975 opinion in Southeast Promo-
tions v. Conrad, "[el ach medium of expression ... must be assessed for
First Amendment purposes by standards suited to it, for each may
present its own problems."243
 The "problem" of regulating indecent
speech on the Internet, as shown in the Supreme Court's opinions in
Ashcroft v. ACLU, decided in 2002, and Reno v. ACLU, decided in 1997,
is the conflict arising from the application of a local community stan-
dard to a medium whose geographic scope of distribution cannot be
limited to exclude communities that might object to certain kinds of
content.244
 The FCC's perverse practice of applying a "nonlocal" stan-
dard to the local medium of broadcasting unnecessarily creates the
inverse problem: an effectively national standard is applied to a me-
dium whose distribution is restricted to an identifiable, local geogra-
phy both by terms of its federal license and by the technological limi-
tations of broadcast signal propagation. 245
 It is impossible to say that
239 See 18 U.S.C. § 1464; Pacifica Order, 56 F.C.C.2d at 94, 97.
24° See 18 U.S.C. § 1464; Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 744-45 & n.20.
241 See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 744-45 & n.20; see also Fox, 489 F.3d at 464 (expressing skep-
ticism that a challenge to the FCC's indecency test could now withstand constitutional
scrutiny).
242 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
243
 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975); see also Reno, 521 U.S. at 868; Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748; Red
Lion Broad. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969).
244
	 Ashcroft 1, 535 U.S. at 575, 595-96 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment);
Reno, 521 U.S. at 877-78. But see Sable, 492 U.S. at 125-26 (dispensing easily with the con-
flict between local standards and a national means of distribution, in part because a com-
mercial provider of sexually explicit "dial-a-porn" telephone messages was able to choose
the communities to which it would direct its service by screening or blocking techniques).
24 ' See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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the First Amendment "standards" employed by the FCC are "suited"
to the characteristics of broadcasting: the FCC's practice turns the
Court's rule on its head. 246
The FCC's practice also denies to broadcast speech the benefit of
the rule that the Court relied on to resolve the conflict that local stan-
dards pose to national means of distribution in 1989, in Sable Communi-
cations of California v. FCC, and, in a somewhat more severe form, to re-
solve the same conflict in Ashcroft I: "If a publisher wishes for its
material to be judged only by the standards of particular communities,
then it need only take the simple step of utilizing a medium that en-
ables it to target the release of its material into those communities." 247
Broadcasting is a medium that targets its material to "particular com-
munities," but by employing a benchmark "based on a broader stan-
dard for broadcasting generally," the FCC refuses to judge broadcast
content by the standards of the community actually targeted by the li-
censee's broadcast signal. 248
The inappropriateness of the FCC's reliance on a "non-local" stan-
dard to regulate the content of what is an unavoidably local medium is
confirmed by the fact that the Commission's indecency policy funda-
mentally conflicts with the practices and policies by which it regulates
all other aspects of broadcast program content. 249 As the FCC has con-
sistently held for half a century, these policies apply a public interest
standard that requires consultation of the particular "tastes, needs, and
desires" of the specific, local community each broadcaster is licensed to
246 See Reno, 521 U.S. at 868; Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975);
Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 386.
242 AMonft I, 535 U.S. at 583 (opinion of Thomas, J.); see also Sable, 492 U.S. at 125-26. In
this context, it is noteworthy that in Roth u United States, the 1957 case in which the Court first
adopted "contemporary conununity standards" as the proper measure of obscenity, the jury
had been instructed to consider the effect of the challenged material "not upon any particu-
lar class, but upon all those whom it is likely to reach." See 354 U.S. 476, 490 (1957) (emphasis
added). Broadcast content can "reach" only persons located within the range of a geographi-
cally limited broadcast signal. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
249 See Infinity, 3 F.C.C.R. at 933.
249
 See generally Broadcast Localism, 23 F.C.C.R. 1324 (2008); Revision of Programming
and Commercialization Policies, Ascertainment Requirements, and Program Log Re-
quirements for Commercial Television Stations (Television Deregulation Order), 98 F.C.C.2d
1075, 1085(1984); Deregulation of Radio (Radio Deregulation Order), 84 F.C.C.2d 968, 978-
79, 988-94 (1981); Network Programming Inquiry, 25 Fed. Reg. 7291, 7294-96 (FCC Aug.
3, 1960). See generally Primer on Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Ap-
plicants (Ascertainment Primer), 27 F.C.C.2d 650 (1971). Feldman notes the fundamental
contradiction between the FCC's strong rule of localism in regulating in the public interest
and its emphatic disregard of local tastes and interests under its indecency policy. See
Feldman, 511PITI note 23, at 398.
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serve .250 By contrast, consideration of national interests and concerns,
the FCC has ruled, does nothing to advance a licensee's public interest
obligation except to the degree these happen to intersect with those of
the broadcaster's community of license 251
 To regulate indecent con-
tent alone under a standard that rejects the consideration of local
"tastes, needs, and desires" makes the FCC's practices not just anoma-
lous but perverse. 252
B, The Constitutional Infirmities of the FCC's Standard
The constitutional infirmities that result from the FCC's rejection
of a local standard for indecency determinations have been recognized
by the Court since Millen253
 To begin with, the practice opens the FCC's
indecency rule to charges that it is unconstitutionally vague because the
Commission's use of "contemporary community standard for broad-
casting generally" functions as the kind of national standard rejected by
Miller as "hypothetical and unascertainable."254 To eliminate this uncer-
tainty, Miller endorsed local standards which, although they may vary by
community, at least have the merit of being ascertainable from the
judgment of juries operating within identifiable communities. 255
 The
FCC's formulation of a national community standard "for the broadcast
community generally," is just the kind of abstraction rejected by the
2N Network Programming Inquiry, 25 Fed. Reg. at 7294-96.
251 See id. at 7294 (explaining that the broadcaster's duty to the public interest is con-
sidered only in terms of the area he is licensed to serve").
252 Compare id. at 7294-96, with Infinity, 3 F.C.C.R. at 933.
255 See Ashcroft I, 535 U.S. at 593, 597 (Kennedy, j„ concurring in the judgment); id. at
612 (Stevens, j„ dissenting); Reno, 521 U.S. at 874, 877-78; Miller, 413 U.S. at 30, 32-33 &
n.13. Because indecency embraces a field of content much broader in scope than that
encompassed by obscenity, and because even content falling within the definition of inde-
cency is due constitutional protection, a policy that fails to observe the required protec-
tions potentially results in more significant consequences than a similar failure with re-
spect to obscenity. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 877-78; Sable., 492 U.S. at 126 (holding an outright
ban on the conunercial transmission of indecent telephone messages unconstitutional
because sexual expression that is indecent but not obscene is protected by the First
Amendment); cf. Ashcroft I, 535 U.S. at 578 (holding that the risks of unconstitutional bur-
dens on speech are reduced under regulation with a substantially narrower focus than the
wide area of indecency).
254 See 413 U.S. at 31. In Jacobellis v. Ohio, Justice Brennan argued that the best solution
to uncertainty about standards would be the adoption of a national standard of obscenity,
which would eliminate unpredictable variations among differing communities. Scc378 U.S.
184, 193-94 (1964) (Brennan, J., announcing the judgment of the Court). But if a na-
tional standard is "hypothetical and unascertainable' in the conclusion of Miller, then it
does nothing to provide the certainty Justice Brennan sought. See 413 U.S. at 31.
255 See Miller, 413 U.S. at 30; see also Jacobellis, 378 U.S. at 200 (Warren, CI, dissenting).
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Court in Miller because it leaves the broadcaster operating within a par-
ticular, local community without a clear guide as to the limits of accept-
able speech. 256
Even if a national standard were in fact ascertainable for pur-
poses of indecency determinations, it is likely that the Court would
hold its application unconstitutional in the context of broadcast inde-
cency. 257 This is because under a national standard, content found
acceptable in more tolerant communities but not under the national
standard would be unavailable for broadcast anywhere, even though it
would be acceptable according to the standards of these more toler-
ant communities, and even though it could, by that measure, serve to
advance the public interest by meeting the "needs, tastes, and desires"
of such communities. 258 It is the refusal of the Court to permit this
particular burden that has left it unwilling to abandon a local stan-
dard for indecency determinations in other media even when the
regulation in question applies to a purely national means of distribu-
tion, such as the Internet. 259 In fact, since Miller, the Court has never
approved the use of a national standard, either in indecency or in ob-
scenity determinations. 26°
Finally, the FCC's rejection of local standards in indecency deter-
minations runs directly counter to the consistent direction of the
Court's First Amendment jurisprudence because it eliminates the pos-
sibility for local variation and individual choice in content decisions
and replaces these with the conclusions of a centralized, governmental
agency applying uniform rules of its own formulation. 261 Considered at
the level of the local community, the practice ignores the Court's rec-
ognition in Miller that "[p]eople in different States vary in their tastes
256 See Reno, 521 U.S. at 874; Miller, 413 U.S. at 30-31; facobellis, 378 U.S. at 200 (War-
ren, C.j., dissenting).
257 See Reno, 521 U.S. at 874, 877-78; Miller, 413 U.S. at 32 & n.13; Manual Enters. v.
Day, 370 U.S. 478, 488 (1962).
256 See Reno, 521 U.S. at 874, 877-78; Miller, 413 U.S. at 32 & n.13; Manual Entem, 370
U.S. at 488; Network Programming Inquiry, 25 Fed. Reg. at 7294-96 (establishing that
broadcast programming serves the public interest of its designated community of license
to the extent it satisfies that community's particular needs, tastes, and desires).
259 See Ashcroft I, 535 U.S. at 585, 597 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); Reno,
521 U.S. at 874, 877-78; see also Manual Enters., 370 U.S. at 488 (finding such a result "in-
tolerable").
266 See Ashcroft 1, 535 U.S. at 580; Reno, 521 U.S. at 874 n.39. But see Ashcroft I, 535 U.S. at
587 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (advocating the
introduction of a national standard for application to the Internet); id. at 590 (Breyer, j.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (arguing that Congress intended the
application of a national standard under the statute at issue).
261 See Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 763; Sable, 492 U.S. at 124-25; Miller, 413 U.S. at 33.
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and attitudes," and that this variation reflects and enables choice by
speakers and audiences.262 The FCC's policy threatens, against the
warning of Miller, to "strangle[]" this diversity by the "absolutism" of an
"imposed uniformity. "265
 Considered at the level of the individual citi-
zen, the FCC's practice of regulating content under a single standard
eliminates any possibility for the exercise of choice.264
 This is true
whether one conceives of choice under Justice Stevens's notion that
like-minded citizens "self-sort" by choosing to settle in communities
that share and enforce their individual, varying views on what is accept-
able for themselves and their children, or under the principle that a
jury in a criminal obscenity trial or a community board overseeing local
cable programming both serve to solicit and express the particular
standards held by representative, individual citizens of the community
most interested in the judgment they are called upon to make. 265
In the context of obscenity determinations, the Court has ac-
knowledged that expert testimony can play a part in establishing the
nature of local community standards. 266
 It is conceivable, therefore,
that under Court direction the FCC could develop an administrative
fact finding process that, by relying on experts and the measuring of
local, public opinion, legitimately establishes a local community stan-
dard when the Commission is called upon to employ one in resolving
an indecency complaint under § 1464.267
 The Commission appears,
262 413 U.S. at 33; see Ashcroft I, 535 U.S. at 612 (Stevens, j., dissenting); Reno, 521 U.S.
at 874, 877-78.
263
 See Miller, 413 U.S. at 33.
264 See Ashcroft v. ACLU (Ashcroft II), 542 U.S. 656, 667, 670 (2004); Ashcroft I, 535 U.S.
at 612 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Playboy, 529 U.S. at 814-15, 818; Reno, 521 U.S. at 877-78;
Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 754, 756-58; Roth, 354 U.S. at 506 (Harlan, J. concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part); see also Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622,
641 (1994) ("At the heart of the First Amendment lies the principle that each person
should decide for himself or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consid-
eration, and adherence."); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. l5, 25 (1971) ("[I] t is largely
because government officials cannot make principled distinctions in this area that the
Constitution leaves matters of taste and style so largely to the individual.").
265
 Sec Ashcroft I, 535 U.S. at 612 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 763
(Breyer, J., announcing the judgment of the Court); Handing, 418 U.S. at 105; Miller, 413
U.S. at 30, 32.
266
	 Miller, 413 U.S. at 31 & n.12; see also Hamling, 418 U.S. at 109-10; Smith v. Cali-
fornia, 361 U.S. 147, 164-65 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (approving of the use of
experts to enlighten the judgment of the tribunal as to the prevailing literary and moral
community standards in an obscenity determination).
267 Sec 18 U.S.C. § 1464; Miller, 413 U.S. at 31; Smith, 361 U.S. at 164-65. The FCC has
long required that broadcast licensees make detailed inquiries of community tastes, needs,
and desires in order to fulfill their obligation to provide programming that meets the pub-
lic interest. See supm notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
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however, to have considered and rejected just this approach to evalu-
ate obscenity complaints under § 1464 precisely at the time it intro-
duced its problematic "broader standard for broadcasting generally"
in indecency determinations.268
The simplest resolution to the problem posed by the FCC's inde-
cency standard, and the one that would he most consistent with the
Court's decisions, would be for the Court to require that the FCC
abandon the practice of pursuing indecency adjudications as achninis-
trative proceedings on the view that a centralized, bureaucratic pro-
cedure is unlikely to establish the standards of far-flung communities
potentially deprived of content they might, under their own stan-
dards, find acceptable and desirable to receive. 269 A truly effective
resolution would therefore limit the Commission to pursuing viola-
tions of § 1464 only in the setting of a civil trial that takes place in the
judicial district encompassing the community of license of the station
charged with broadcasting indecent material and that employs a local
jury to determine whether the content of a challenged broadcast in
fact violates the standards of that community, 2" As Judge Bazelon of
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit observed in
reversing the FCC's Pacifica Order in 1977, the jury is "an exceptionally
sturdy mechanism for soliciting community standards."271
CONCLUSION
Because the FCC's reliance on a national standard for indecency
conflicts with the Supreme Court's consistent requirement that judg-
2° See supra notes 164-169 and accompanying text. The FCC has asserted that such an
approach would be "highly burdensome and of dubious reliability." See Video 44 ( Video 44
1), 103 F.C.C.2d 1204, 1207 (1987).
269 Sec Pacifica Found. v. FCC (Pacifica Appeal), 556 F.2d 9, 23 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(Bazelon, C,11„ concurring) (explaining that the FCC's fact finding in the complaint
against WBAI-FM consisted of nothing more than the FCC's recording of its own conclu-
sion that the words broadcast were indecent); see also Feldman, supra note 23 at 392.
270 See 18 U.S.C. § 1464; Miller, 413 U.S. at 30-32; Pacifica Appeal, 556 F.2d at 23 11.15;
United States v. Kennerley, 209 F. 119, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1913) (suggesting in the words of
Judge Hand that "a jury is especially the organ with which to feel the content comprised"
within the concept of contemporary community standards).
271 Pacifica Appeal, 556 F.2d at 23 n.15 (Bazelon, CJ., concurring); Kennerley, 209 F. at
121. Feldman advocates that alleged indecency violations be referred to criminal prosecu-
tion in federal district courts, thereby guaranteeing access to the judgment of a local jury;
the FCC would then be obliged to rely on the findings of the local jury in executing its civil
sanctions. Sec Feldman, supra note 23, at 392. The approach has the advantage of securing
a jury to apply contemporary community standards, but the requirement of a criminal
proceeding seems draconian and particularly problematic considering that the right of
free expression is at issue. See id.
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ment must be made by reference to local community standards in both
indecency and obscenity determinations, and because, more broadly,
the FCC's practice violates the fundamental principle of choice that the
Court has defended in the First Amendment, the Supreme COurt
should direct the FCC to abandon its anomalous national community
standard. The Court should require that the FCC establish that alleg-
edly offensive material violates the particular standards of the local
community in which it was broadcast before the FCC may sanction a
licensee for the broadcast of indecent content. In addition to bringing
FCC indecency policy into conformity with the Court's requirements
for indecency and obscenity regulation in all other contexts, this
change would establish consistency between the FCC's indecency regu-
lations and the policies and practices under which the FCC regulates all
other forms of broadcast content. All forms of content regulation justi-
fied under the FCC's public interest standard would then be required
to refer to the actual interest of the community in which the program-
ming is broadcast, and indecency would no longer be a strange outlier
of the Commission's regulatory practice.
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